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DIFFERING VISIONS - DIFFERING
VALUES: A COMMENT ON JUDGE
PARKER'S REFORMATION MODEL FOR
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
Judge G. Thomas Eisele
"Justice, sir, is the great interest of man on earth."
Daniel Webster, September 12, 1845
I. INTRODUCTION
I have been asked to respond to, and comment on, Judge Parker's article
in this edition of the SMU Law Review. But it is not feasible to discuss
his radical proposals for changing our federal courts without speaking of
the actions being taken by the whole court-annexed, mandatory ADR move-
ment. That movement presently proceeds with a grand array of initiatives,
the ultimate effect of which, if successful, will be to change dramatically our
system of civil justice. More importantly, it will effectively deny the inhabit-
ants of this country their traditional right to a due process, evidentiary-
based, trial before an Article III judge or before a jury in accordance with
equal protection principles, that is to their traditional "day in court." Judge
Parker's article serves to make that point dramatically. In the past, the tac-
tic of the mandatory ADR proponents appears to have been to move for-
ward slowly and incrementally, even surreptitiously, in order not to shock
the "traditionalists" into action. Judge Parker, with commendable frank-
ness, criticizes this approach, calling out for revolutionary change to a new
"reformation model of civil dispute resolution." ' He states that current
ADR programs and procedures, though promising, are inadequate to resolve
the civil litigation system's problem of cost and delay.2 His new model of
civil dispute resolution would be public and taxpayer-supported and would
contain "an array of litigation tracks," which he repeatedly states will pro-
duce "speedy, affordable, fair and reliable decisions."' 3 The old involuntary
Ed. note: SMU LAW REVIEW invited Judge Eisele to write this article as a response to an-
other article published in this issue. See Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR"
Techniques in the Reformation Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905
(1993).
1. Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the Reformation Model of
Civil Resolution, 46 SMU L. REV. 1905 (1993) [hereinafter Parker].
2. Id. at 1901-11.
3. Id. at 1905.
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ADR advocates staunchly argued that their mandatory ADR diversions did
not deny litigants their right to a real trial before a judge or a jury because,
at the end of those costly and prejudicial diversions, the parties could still
demand a trial de novo as a matter of right. Judge Parker one-ups them by
having the decisions made by his various ADR tracks carry a "presumption
of finality."'4 To him this means that the party or parties requesting a real
trial after the ADR track decision would have the burden of demonstrating
to a judge at an exemption hearing, through a "cost/benefit analysis, the
need to expend additional litigant and judicial resources on their cases.",
Judge Parker would bring his ADR tracks to the front line of civil dispute
resolution and would relegate real trials to "alternative," seldom-used, sta-
tus. 6 Or, as he puts it, "the traditionally routine form of civil dispute resolu-
tion [translation: a real trial before a judge or jury] ascends to its appropriate
place as the institutionally exceptional." '7
I will identify both the real and the stated reasons for mandatory court-
annexed ADR programs and the need and justifications thereof; trace
briefly the history of the court-annexed ADR movement; discuss the poli-
tics of this controversy; evaluate the results of such programs; examine
Judge Parker's proposals in context; and spell out my reasons for opposing
them. Finally, I issue an appeal to the lay citizenry, the bar, the judges, the
new Administration, and the Congress to rise up and say "NO" to this alien
intrusion into our United States District Courts - those special places that
have served this nation so well over the past two centuries.
II. THE NEED AND JUSTIFICATION: IS THERE A CRISIS?
The standard today by which we in the judging business are to measure
our success is cost and delay. Each district court in the United States has
been called upon to formulate a "cost and delay reduction plan." Let us
look at the delay question. Judge Parker notes that in 1960 it would have
taken district courts nine months to dispose of all of their pending cases
whereas in 1989 the figure had risen to 11.7 months.9 Now look at more
recent figures and trends.' 0 In 1985 the total case filings in all U.S. District
Courts came to 299,164; in 1986, 282,074; in 1987, 268,023; in 1988,
269,174; in 1989, 263,896; in 1990, 251,113; in 1991, 241,420; and in 1992,
261,698. So in a period of seven years the total filings have fallen from
299,164 to 261,698. The number of civil filings per judgeship fell from 476
in 1985 to 379 in 1990 - a period when the number of judgeships remained
4. Id.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Parker, supra note 1, at 1905.
7. Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 417 (Supp. It 1990).
9. Parker, supra note 1, at 1907 (citing, JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES, FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT 5 (Apr. 2, 1990)).
10. For the following figures, see Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court
Management Statistics (1992) [hereinafter Administrative Office] (on file with SMU Law Re-
view). The year cited will be the 12 month period ending June 30 of that year, so, for example,
"1992" will be for the year ending June 30, 1992.
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constant at 575. In 1991 the number of judgeships increased to 649 and the
number of civil cases per judgeship fell to 320. For 1992 the figure is 350."1
We are frequently told that our criminal dockets are interfering with our
civil dockets, and this has certainly been true in a few of our federal districts.
But the number of felony filings per judgeship only increased from forty-four
in 1985 to fifty-eight in 1990. In 1992, that number fell to fifty-three. The
total filings per judgeship, criminal and civil, have been lower than they were
in 1991 (372) in only two years since 1975. And the weighted filings per
judgeship have likewise fallen in the past five years from 461 in 1986 to 405
in 1992.12
So there is not much support for the oft-repeated assertions that "federal
court system has entered a period of crisis;" 13 that our courts are "on the
verge of buckling under the strain;" 14 that "our courts are swamped and
unmanageable;"'1 5 or, as stated by Magistrate Judge Wagner before the
House Committee last May, that our courts are faced with "burgeoning civil
case dockets" 16 - the very assertions being used to justify turning to these
mandatory ADR programs. The actual figures and trends simply do not
support such doomsday hyperbole.
On the issue of delay we find, as always, that a few district courts are
having considerable trouble moving their dockets, but overall we find the
same median time from filing to disposition in civil cases (nine months) for
each year from 1985 until 1992.17 And the period between issue and trial in
1992 (fourteen months) is the same as it was in 1985.18 A Rand Corporation
study 19 confirms that the rhetoric about unconscionable and escalating de-
lays in processing and trying cases in the federal district court system is
nothing more than myth:
Another finding of the Rand study was that "the aggregate performance
of the federal district courts had remained remarkably stable during the
1970s and 1980s, despite a substantial increase in caseload during that
period." Nationwide, according to the report, "delay was about the
same in 1986 as it was in 1971" and there was little evidence "to sup-
port the view that time to disposition has been lengthening." The con-
clusion, says Dungworth, "is a surprise to most people."'20
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis, Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 1, 1 (1990) (Judge Kaufman is the former
chief judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.).
14. Id.
15. Judge Richard A. Enslen, ADR: Another Acronym, or a Viable Alternative to the High
Cost of Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate Commences, 18 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1
(1988).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 102-1085, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
17. Administrative Office, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. TERRENCE DUNGWORTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, RAND, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1990).
20. Ellen J. Pollock & Edward Felsenthal, Rand Corp. Study Shows that Federal Civil
Cases Rarely Go to Trial, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., 1990, at 3.
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So overall there is no crisis or emergency in our federal district courts
which requires a panic reaction by the Congress. Nor is there any reason for
the Congress or the Judicial Conference to be giving up on our civil trial
system which, I submit, is the best in the world.
III. BACKGROUND OF COURT-ANNEXED ADRs
"My greatest concern with the federal courts is the ability of the courts
to guarantee due process while dispensing justice in a timely manner."
Presidential Candidate Bill Clinton 21
This year, 1993, will be a crunch year for our federal courts. Decisions in
the offing could dramatically change the role and function of those courts
and, in the process, undermine some very fundamental rights which have
traditionally been enjoyed by the inhabitants of this country. This is because
of the confluence of lobbying efforts on behalf of those associated with the
court-annexed mandatory ADR movement.
What is the history of this movement? Why are we in the federal court
system being surfeited with these court-annexed ADR programs? I can only
give you my personal opinion. It is because Chief Justice Warren Burger
attended the Pound Revisited Conference back in 1976 on the "Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." That confer-
ence spawned a healthy re-examination of our institutions of justice. Inno-
vation became the name of the game. Our Chief, God bless him, came away
starry-eyed, and, I submit, embraced these innovations uncritically. 22 You
see, he appears to be convinced, perhaps by the British, that the jury system
is rarely needed or useful in civil cases. But then you can get an idea about
how Chief Justice Burger felt about juries by simply reading his opinions.
To get on with the story, Chief Justice Burger nodded his approval of the
movement and many federal judges enthusiastically signed on.
A few years ago, I attended the summer program for lawyers at Harvard.
About thirty federal judges were given the opportunity to participate. One
afternoon we were invited for a little get-together with Professor Frank
Sanders, who decided to utilize the occasion to preach the ADR gospel. It
turns out that he was at the Pound Conference, that he is one of the found-
ing fathers of the ADR movement, and that he served as the Chair of the
Standing Committee on Dispute Resolution of the ABA. I accused him of
being responsible for all our troubles, but he graciously refused to take all
the credit. Professor Sanders is a renowned teacher and scholar. My prob-
lem is not with the overall ADR movement that he leads, but with the move-
ment's insistence upon annexing such programs to our federal courts.
Professor Sanders at that meeting in Cambridge told us of his vision of the
future. As I understand it, he sees an immense federal building. Inside, one
21. Bill Clinton States Positions on the Federal Judiciary, 76 JUDICATURE 97, 100 (1992).
22. See WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES TO
IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (1990). Chief Justice Burger was, in my opinion,
one of the best administrators the federal courts ever had. That means that I was in agreement
with most of his administrative initiatives.
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would find sort of a cafeteria or smorgasbord 23 of dispute resolution mecha-
nisms: voluntary and compulsory arbitration, specialized administrative
agencies, early neutral evaluations, minitrials, summary jury trials, neutral
experts, medical arbitration, and mediation and negotiation teams. And, oh
yes, somewhere in the building would be a "traditional" - translate "old
fashioned and outmoded" court. This, I gather, is the precursor of Judge
Parker's federal dispute resolution center.
Although certain congressional committees have been interested in the
ADR movement, the Congress as a whole has not faced up directly to the
issues involved in annexing mandatory ADRs to our federal district courts.
The pilot court-annexed arbitration programs, commenced in three courts in
1978 and later expanded to ten courts, had no substantive legislative en-
dorsement until 1988.24 In that year proponents not only sought legislative
legitimacy for the ten existing pilot programs but they also asked Congress
to authorize ten additional such mandatory programs. Opponents inter-
vened at the last minute and Congress ended up giving sanction to the ten
mandatory programs and adding ten additional voluntary programs. 25 The
legislative authorization for all such programs ends, effective November
1993.26 Therefore Congress must act this year in order to continue these
programs.
The pressure is on. Magistrate Judge John Leo Wagner, testifying before
the House Subcommittee on Intellective Property and Judicial Administra-
23. This is not just my metaphor. No less than Chief Justice Rehnquist in his 1992 Kas-
tenmeier Lecture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison described the issue thusly:
On one end of the spectrum is a view of future federal courts as comprehen-
sive justice centers, offering consumers a whole menu of dispute resolution pro-
cedures. Under this view federal judges would serve as a sort of managerial
maitre d', steering the litigant to the most appropriate form of dispute resolu-
tion. This would alter the traditional model wherein the federal system toler-
ated the excesses of the adversarial process, including long delays and high
expenses. Under this new model, the system would set up incentives - for
judges and litigants - to swiftly channel disputes into a whole host of alterna-
tive dispute resolution options, even though traditional adversarial justice would
still be available.
This model contemplates that the majority of entrants into the federal legal
system neither expect nor need extensive pre-trial procedures and a full-blown
jury trial. Instead, the model posits that many litigants may have a greater need
for an inexpensive and prompt resolution of their disputes, however rough and
ready, than an unaffordable and tardy one, however close to perfection.
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Address at the Kastenmeier Lecture, University of Wis-
consin-Madison (Sept. 15, 1992), in 1993 Wis. L. REV. 1, 8-9. So our status as federal judges
will change to "managerial maitre d's"! What concerns me about the Chief's statement is its
aura of detached scientific objectivity - an objectivity that I acknowledge I find difficult to
achieve when dealing with such fundamental rights and values. Still I appreciate his sugges-
tion that these ADR vehicles are nothing more than rough and ready ways to clear the docket
whereas traditional trials are likely to be close to perfection. I worry, however, about patroniz-
ing litigants by telling them that they have a greater need to submit their controversy to one or
another of these rough and ready ADRs than they, themselves, are willing to acknowledge.
Let them have their "close-to-perfection" day in court if they want it! I also do not buy into
the suggestion that our traditional method of resolution is an unaffordable and tardy one.
24. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988).
25. Id. §§ 651(a), 658(2).
26. Id. § 651.
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tion in June, 1992, stated: "Faced with the pressures caused by burgeoning
civil case dockets, courts looked to alternatives to the normal litigation
route.... The Courts soon recognized that in addition to a docket control
mechanism, ADR programs had intrinsic value; they often bring better re-
sults for litigants than trials."' 27 Judge William Schwarzer, Director of the
Federal Judicial Center also testified at that time. He requested the subcom-
mittee to support legislation that would allow all federal courts to adopt
local rules for court-annexed arbitration programs, either mandatory or vol-
untary, at the option and choice of each district court.28 This tracks the
recommendation of Ms. Barbara S. Meierhoefer:
In light of our generally favorable findings detailed in this report on the
mandatory programs, it is therefore recommended that the Judicial
Conference of the United States propose that Congress enact an arbitra-
tion provision in title 28, United States Code, authorizing arbitration in
all federal district courts, to be mandatory or voluntary or a combina-
tion of both in the discretion of the court.29
It is a smart tactic for the Federal Judicial Center to call for legislation
authorizing arbitration in all federal district courts "to be mandatory or
voluntary in the discretion of the court."'30 Many federal judges who oppose
mandatory ADR programs go along with legislation which would permit
individual district courts or individual United States District Judges to adopt
mandatory ADR programs on the rationale: "No one is forcing me to adopt
such programs, so why should I object if other judges want to install them?"
I suggest that such "go along" judges constitute the weak link in the defense
of some very fundamental rights and principles. And I predict that, down
the road, they will see the tactics of the involuntary court-annexed ADR
movement change. After they succeed in getting a large number of such
programs installed they will urge the Congress and the Judicial Conference
to require them in every district court. The writing is clearly on the wall. 3 1
Indeed, one has only to look at Judge Parker's proposal to realize that that
future has arrived.
The real problem with this approach, however, is that it puts the decision
in the wrong hands - in the hands of us federal judges. Why should I, as a
U.S. District Judge, or why should the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas through a vote of its judges, be permitted to install such
27. House Studies Alternate Dispute Resolution in Federal Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH,
June 1992, at 5.
28. Id.
29. BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER, COURT-ANNEXED AR-
BITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 13 (1990).
30. Id.
31. For instance, Judge Raymond Broderick concluded his article entitled "Court-An-
nexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works" with the following statement. "The history of its
successful operation in many state courts and the success of the experimental programs in our
federal courts is convincing evidence that the time has come to consider making court-annexed
compulsory arbitration an integral part of our federal judicial system". Hon. Raymond J.
Broderick, Court-Annexed Compulsory Arbitration: It Works, 72 JUDICATURE 217, 226 (1988).
And Judge Parker in his article calls upon the Congress to adopt and install his new reforma-
tion model in our federal courts. Parker, supra note 1, at 1932-33.
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involuntary ADR programs in our court and make participation in such
program or programs a condition precedent to a party's right to a traditional
trial of his or her case before a jury or an Article III judge? Although I am a
great believer in the value and benefits of judicial discretion, I do not believe
we judges should have that power. We should stop talking about giving
judges the right to impose such programs upon litigants in our courts and
start talking about the rights of persons directly involved, the parties to such
civil litigation.
IV. FEDERAL JUDGES AND ABA POLITICS
In an effort to bring the issue forward for discussion at the highest policy
level of the ABA, a resolution was submitted to the Executive Committee of
the National Conference of Federal Trial Judges, the operative portion of
which read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Conference of
Federal Trial Judges this day go on record opposing the enactment by
Congress of any legislation authorizing the installation of any
Mandatory ADR Programs in our United States District Courts where
involuntary participation in such programs is made a condition prece-
dent to the right of litigants in civil cases to a trial before a jury or a
federal judge. 32
It was adopted at the February 1992 meeting and then scheduled for discus-
sion before the Council of the Judicial Administrative Division at the August
1992 meeting in San Francisco. The day before the matter was to be taken
up by the Council, however, Judge Robert Peckham, Judge William
Schwarzer, Judge Stan Brotman, and Mr. Bob Landis appeared before the
Executive Committee of the Conference at which time a "Request for Re-
consideration" was filed by Judge Peckham supported by a ten-page brief.33
Judge Peckham urged not only the withdrawal of the resolution but that it
be replaced with a new resolution calling upon Congress to enact legislation
permitting individual federal courts to adopt, in their discretion, local rules
for either mandatory or voluntary ADR mechanisms such as mediation,
early neutral evaluation, and arbitration, which were the very programs that
Judge Peckham's court had installed in the Northern District of Califor-
nia.34 Our small executive committee, in effect, "compromised." It with-
drew its resolution, but did not replace it with the one recommended by
32. Resolution of the National Conference of Federal Trial Judges (Feb. 1, 1992) (on file
with SMU Law Review).
33. Memorandum from Judge Robert F. Peckham to the Executive Committee of the
National Conference of Federal Trial Judges (Aug. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Memorandum] (on
file with SMU Law Review). After this article was drafted, I learned of Judge Peckham's
death. He was one of the giants among the federal judges of the nation, admired and respected
by all. I was lucky to have had a long and cordial relationship with him. On most issues
affecting the federal judiciary, we were in full agreement. This mandatory ADR issue was the
exception. We simply agreed to disagree. I was hoping and expecting that he would respond
to this article, defending his point of view with his usual vigor, wit and logic. He would not
want or expect me to "back off," and I will not. Judge Peckham will be missed, sorely missed,
by all of those who love this marvelous institution: the United States District Courts.
34. Id. at 1.
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Judge Peckham, the total effect being that this extremely important matter
will not in the foreseeable future be debated at the highest level of the ABA.
That is really a shame because the ABA is sorely in need of some education
on this issue - one of those "defining" issues, the outcome of which will
determine the role of our United States District Courts well into the next
century.
Since Judge Peckham's alternate proposal is very similar to the positions
taken by the Federal Court Study Committee and the Federal Judicial
Center, it is instructive to briefly discuss his arguments as set forth in his
Memorandum of August 6, 1992. He states:
The [National Conference of Federal Trial Judges'] February resolution
runs counter to significant judicial developments in the field of ADR in
three respects:
I. Its wide-sweeping coverage calls for the dismantling of numerous
well-established federal and state ADR procedures, despite their
proven appeal to litigants, attorneys and judges.
II. It would thwart the district courts' experimentation with a wide
range of ADR programs, thereby frustrating the spirit of the
CJRA and impeding an invaluable opportunity to learn how best
to design court ADR programs.
III. It flies in the face of widespread endorsement of presumptively
mandatory ADR programs by influential judicial and legal bod-
ies, Congress and the executive branch.3 5
His first point is that forbidding such involuntary ADR programs would
have the effect of "dismantling ... numerous, well-established federal ...
ADR programs despite their proven appeal."' 36 This argument gives insight
into the strategy of the ADR movement. First you install such programs on
a temporary, pilot, experimental basis and then, after they have been used
for sufficient period of time, you call them "well established" and, ergo, pre-
sumptively sacrosanct. And what justification do they give for continuing
such programs? Nothing of more substance than "their proven appeal to
litigants, attorneys and judges."' 37 My first answer to this contention has
always been: if there is such universal acceptance of these ADR programs,
why is it necessary to make them mandatory? The answer is that if they are
voluntary, they will not be used. As Judge Peckham acknowledges in his
memorandum, "[s]ome voluntary ADR programs have been unsuccessful in
attracting participants. '38 He explains:
For example, one district court has a voluntary arbitration program
that provides for notification to participants in selected cases with an
invitation to opt-in. The program "has been strikingly unsuccessful in
attracting cases, despite a considerable effort at bar outreach. Of 1,115
cases notified thus far, only one has opted-in." Similarly, very few cases
have been "volunteered" into the ENE program in the Northern Dis-
35. Id. at 1-2.





trict of California .... 39
He tries to account for this "serious shortfall of voluntary participants" as
follows:
Parties may not be aware of alternatives. Attorneys may be unwilling
to advise trying "something new" for fear their advice will be faulted if
the something new does not work out. And they may be wary of elect-
ing a procedure that might be construed as a sign of weakness. They
may also fear disclosing their case in advance of trial or believe that, in
some cases, delay serves the best interest of their clients and may there-
fore avoid programs that purport to speed cases to disposition. 4°
Let me help the good judge: Might they not simply want truth and principle
vindicated and a just resolution of their case in ajudicial forum on the mer-
its; in sum, justice?
V. INTRA-JUDICIARY POLITICS
On the civil side, the American justice system embodying the concept of
the right to a trial before a jury or a judge, the traditional right to one's "day
in court", is under merciless attack from a broad, but loose, coalition of
forces composed of academics, ADR special interest groups, politicians, and,
strangely enough, a few federal judges, who, because of their roles within the
judiciary policy making establishment,41 exercise leverage and power far be-
yond their numbers. Judge Parker's article is just the latest, albeit one of the
most dramatic, expressions of the disaffection this group feels toward the
traditional trial (before judge or jury) utilized by our federal courts for over
200 years.
The ADR folks within the federal judiciary come at this issue from all
directions. Strangely, the judges dealing with the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure got into the act last year with their proposal to change Rule 16(c),
which deals with the subjects for consideration at pre-trial conferences. 42 In
a letter from Judge Sam Pointer to Judge Robert Keeton of June 13, 1991,
we find the following with respect to Rule 16(c)(9):
In subdivision (c)(9) the revision amplifies the power of the court with
respect to various ADR techniques. The additional sentence at the end
of subdivision (c) provides that parties, or their representatives or insur-
ers, can be required to attend settlement conferences or participate in
ADR proceedings. While the court should be reluctant to order unwill-
ing litigants to participate in such settlement efforts and proceedings, it
is important that this power be recognized. 43
The rule as then drafted made it clear that it was dealing with ADR pro-
39. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
40. Id. (quoting MEIERHOEFER, supra note 29, at 120).
41. Judge Parker, for instance, is not just any district judge. He is the Chair of the very
influential Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the United States
Judicial Conference.
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
43. Attachment to letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, to Judge Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure (June 13, 1991) (on file with SMU Law Review).
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grams and it purported specifically to authorize the use of regularly sum-
moned jurors in summary jury trials. Then proposed Rule 16(c)(9) was
redrafted to identify one of the subjects for consideration at pre-trial confer-
ences as "the possibility of settlement and the use of special procedures to
assist in resolving the dispute." 44 Ambiguous, yes, but innocuous enough.
Now read the last sentence of proposed Rule 16 which stated: "The court
may require that parties, or their representatives or insurers, attend a confer-
ence to consider possibilities of settlement and participate in proceedings or-
dered under paragraph (9).1'45 If there had been no committee notes or
commentary no one would likely have appreciated the scope and significance
of the proposal. There is nothing in the proposed language which would
suggest that it is intended to empower federal district courts to require par-
ties in civil cases to submit to any of a variety of mandatory court-annexed
ADR programs that the judge might think up as a condition upon those
parties' right to a trial before a jury or before a judge. But when we refer to
the committee notes all doubt is expelled.
Parties should not be forced by the court into settlements, and the lack
of interest of a party to participate in settlement discussions may be a
signal that the time and expense involved in pursuing settlement may be
unproductive. Nevertheless, the court should have the power in appropri-
ate cases to require parties to participate in proceedings that may indicate
to them - or their adversaries - the wisdom of resolving the litigation
without resort to a full trial on the merits. Of course the court should
not impose unreasonable burdens on a party as a device to extract set-
tlement, such as by requiring officials with the broad responsibilities to
attend a settlement conference involving relatively minor matters. 46
So I wrote to Judge Keeton and inquired:
Is it reasonable that a proposed change of this importance - a change
which some of us believe may unconstitutionally burden the right of
civil litigants to a trial before a jury or a judge utilizing the usual due
process requirements and evidentiary standards - should be put into
effect by the device of a seemingly innocent change in 16(c) dealing with
"subjects for consideration at pre-trial conferences?" 47
I urged the members of the committee to oppose the proposed change.48 I
am not sure where the committee's proposal stands at the present time but
the point is that the mandatory ADR movement is pervasive.
As a further indication of my paranoia on this subject, I question:
Whatever happened to old 28 U.S.C. section 2072, which gave the Supreme
Court the power to prescribe by general rules the practice and procedure of
44. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S.,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence 11 (Aug. 1991) (on file with SMU Law Review).
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
47. Letter from Chief Judge G. Thomas Eisele, E.D. of Ark., to Judge Robert E. Keeton,
Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Jan. 29, 1992) (on file




our district and circuit courts? 49 The second paragraph of section 2072 pro-
vided that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution." 50 Then along
came the Rules Enabling Act amendments in 1988 and that paragraph was
amended to read, "such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sub-
stantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force
or effect after such rules have taken effect." 5' This amendment was made
under the rubric of a "technical change." It was passed at the same time
that the "Judicial Improvements Act" first gave substantive statutory au-
thority for the ten mandatory court-annexed arbitration "experimental pi-
lot" programs. 52 So if one wishes to venture onto this battlefield he must
constantly protect his flanks.
Precious little vocal opposition to this movement has been expressed by
the bench or the bar of this nation. And no one has chosen to let the com-
mon, lay citizens of this country - the ones whose rights are most directly
affected - in on the conversation. So, while one can excuse the unaware
general citizenry for not rising up in arms, what excuse do judges and law-
yers, particularly trial lawyers, have for their strange silence in the face of
this threat to rights long enjoyed and accepted by Americans? I will venture
a partial explanation. Most federal judges who are not members of the Judi-
cial Conference, or of one of its policy making committees, have tradition-
ally felt it inappropriate to speak out on controversial issues. I suggest that
those federal judges who hold back from expressing their strongly felt views
at this policy making stage are doing themselves, the judiciary as a whole,
the Congress, and the people of this nation a disservice.
There is little that is democratic within the Third Branch. The Chief Jus-
tice, the Judicial Conference, and even committees thereof, regularly inform
Congress as to the "views of the judiciary" often without seeking the yeas
and nays. Particularly this is true with respect to controversial issues. 53
Some will say that that is the way it should be, but I suggest that the country
is not well served by this system. On major policy issues which directly
affect the rights of the citizens of this country, more judges must learn to
speak out. This is particularly so when the "official" spokespersons for the
Third Branch are expressing views on important subjects which are contrary
to those held by most, or many, federal judges. The only excuse I can think
of for the silence of our trial bar is their possible ignorance of the whole
debate. And that is not a good excuse.
The Directors of the Federal Judicial Center are chosen by the Board of
the Federal Judicial Center headed by the Chief Justice. These directors, in
turn, essentially control the "education" of federal judges and others in the
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
50. Id.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
52. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988).
53. Take, for instance, the Sentencing Guidelines. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1988).
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court family. So we see Professor Leo Levin who, as Director, expressed his
(lukewarm?) support for these court-annexed ADR programs back in the
mid 1980s. 54 Now we have another Chief Justice and he too seems to be
coming down on the side of these programs, although this is not clear.15 At
least he appears to be encouraging experimentation with them. Judge Wil-
liam Schwarzer, formerly of the Northern District of California, is now the
Director of the Center, and a more committed true believer one could not
find. The consequence is that the debate lacks the balance which one would
expect knowing how divided federal judges are on this issue. The propo-
nents control the judicial presses, conduct the surveys and the research, and
have better access to the bench, the bar, the Judicial Conference and to the
Congress, and they do not seek genuine debate and discussion. Thus, we
have the very conditions that often produce bad decisions. Judges should
know that.
Back in 1986, the District Judges Association of the Eighth Circuit went
on record "in opposition to any statute or rule of court which would permit
the establishment of a court-annexed arbitration program in any district
court if, under such program, parties to any civil action can be compelled
against their wishes to participate therein."' 56 Overall, however, the opposi-
tion has not been well organized or vocal. 57
Why do proponents of ADRs want to annex them to our federal courts? I
54. A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District
Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985).
55. In the June 1992 issue of The Third Branch there is a report on Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's speech to the American Law Institute, part of which reads as follows:
The American Law Institute, at its annual meeting last month, heard Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist warn that even larger judicial workloads and additional judge-
ships will not be enough to keep up with the "ever-increasing demands of a
litigious citizenry." "It is necessary," he said "to realize that judicial machinery
is a scarce resource ... In the future, access must be regulated to assure that this
scarce resource is available, not simply on the basis of which litigant is the most
ingenious or insistent, but on the basis of the greatest good for the greatest
number."
Chief Justice Addresses Federal Court Workload, Future Needs, THE THIRD BRANCH, June
1992, at 4.
56. Resolution of the District Judges Association of the Eighth Circuit (1986) (on file with
SMU Law Review).
57. But see Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal
Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991). In a letter to me of July 30, 1991, Professor Dayton
states, "I take the position that ADR programs, including court-annexed arbitration, have not
been successful in reducing expense and delay in the federal courts, and threaten many impor-
tant values associated with litigation and, if necessary, trial before an Article III judge." Let-
ter from Kim Dayton, Professor of Law, Univ. of Kan. Sch. of Law, to Chief Judge G.
Thomas Eisele, E. D. of Ark., (July 30, 1991) (on file with the SMU Law Review). And
Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow is apparently having some second thoughts about how ADR
programs work when annexed to courts:
In short, courts try to use various forms of ADR to reduce caseloads and in-
crease court efficiency at the possible cost of realizing better justice. Lawyers
may use ADR not for the accomplishment of a "better" result, but as another
weapon in the adversarial arsenal to manipulate time, methods of discovery, and
rules of procedure for perceived client advantage. Legal challenges cause ADR
"issues" to be decided by courts. An important question that must be con-
fronted is whether forcing ADR to adapt to a legal culture or environment may
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see two reasons. First, they seek legitimacy and want to improve the reputa-
tion and status of such programs by creating the impression with the lay
public that real trials and these ADR mechanisms are really part and parcel
of the same thing. Second, if the court-annexed programs are voluntary, no
one will use them, so they need someone - here a federal court - to compel
participation in those programs.
VI. BUSY-BODY COURTS
The very first sentence of Judge Parker's article confuses and worries me.
It states, "This article advocates a break from the past in terms of how civil
dispute resolution is conducted in this country - specifically, in the federal
district courts."5 18 If we are to break with the past, by which it is assumed he
means the present, then it would be a help to have the answers to two very
different questions: 1) how is the universe of dispute resolution presently
conducted in this country, and 2) how is dispute resolution conducted in the
federal district courts of this country, a subset of that universe? He does not
discuss either question. Rather he asks us to accept on faith that the present
system, whatever it is, is broken and that radical steps must be taken, not to
fix it, but to replace it.
To analyze this, first consider the universe of disputes that meet jurisdic-
tional requirements and therefore could be filed in our federal district courts.
Then ask what percentage of such potential filings actually find their way
into our federal courts? I do not know of any scientific study which will tell
us what that percentage is, but I do not believe that any one would suggest
that it would be more than 10%. Assuming only 10% of such potential
claims actually end up in our federal district courts, then that would mean
that 90% would have been resolved under our present system, whatever that
is, before becoming a court case. How are those non-court disputes presently
being resolved? In what percent are lawyers engaged? What are the circum-
stances that stop those disputes short of the courthouse door? In a way the
answer is obvious. They are resolved through the myriad ways and means
that civil disputes have been resolved between parties throughout the centu-
ries: settlement, compromise, abandonment, etc. In more recent years, pri-
vate parties in an effort to settle their differences, may have turned not only
to lawyers, ministers, or respected neutrals, but they also may have volunta-
rily utilized arbitration, mediation or other ADR programs that are avail-
able on the private market.
be counterproductive to the transformations proponents of ADR would like to
see in our disputing practices.
... Thus, the debates about ADR and the legal resolutions of important pol-
icy and procedural issues affect not only ADR, but the legitimacy of the entire
legal process.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture. A Tale of Innovation
Co-opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1991). It is my view that we
cannot "marry" trial courts, with their judicial procedures, to ADRs without damage to both,
because the aims and techniques of each" are so different from the other, differences not of
degree but of kind.
58. Parker, supra note 1, at 1905.
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Undoubtedly some meritorious claims have not been filed because of the
size thereof, the resources of one or more of the parties, or other circum-
stances independent of the merits of such claim. But one thing is clear: this
non-court dispute resolution system is within the private sphere and, one
way or another, it is working. Government is not involved. The taxpayers
do not pay the costs thereof. If I understand Judge Parker's proposal and
his statements concerning the need to increase access to our courts, I believe
I am correct in concluding that he is advocating that the United States na-
tionalize this private dispute resolution system, create multi-door federal dis-
pute resolution centers, attach them to our federal district courts, greatly
expand federal court civil jurisdiction, and then invite one and all to bring
their disputes to such centers, where, at the cost of the taxpayers, these dis-
putes would be resolved by mandatory assignments to the "appropriate
track" with the decisionmakers being non-judicial personnel. To ADR ad-
vocates the premise for all of this is that the parties and their attorneys do
not know what is best for them.5 9
The second question is: How is dispute resolution presently conducted
within the federal district courts of this country? If we are right in our
hunch that not more than 10% of potential federal court disputes are actu-
ally filed in federal court, then it becomes instructive to determine how the
10% that are so filed are presently resolved. According to a Rand Corpora-
tion study, "almost 95 percent of all private civil cases filed in federal courts
never reach trial, ending instead in settlements or other pretrial
dispositions". 6o
If only 10% of the potential federal civil cases end up in court and if only
5% of those that do end up in court have to be tried, that means that only
one half of 1% of such disputes will be tried before a judge or jury under the
present system, in the absence of these mandatory ADR programs. These
figures, in essence, set the stage for this entire controversy. The proponents
want these programs in order to reduce that 5% trial rate even more, to, say,
2% or 1% or zero! If there are no ADR programs 95% of our civil cases
will go away before trial. If, on the other hand, you set up these ADR pro-
grams and require a majority of your civil cases to go through them, with
their attendant costs, and thereby reduce the trial rate from 5% to 2%, what
has been gained?
Honestly, I find the mandatory court-annexed ADR true believers a bit
schizoid. On the one hand they make their case on the premise that the
federal trial courts in this country are swamped - drowning in a sea of
59. Paternalism pervades the thinking of mandatory ADR advocates. In the first footnote
in his article, Judge Parker quotes from Michael Tigar's 2020 Vision, saying that "the market
behavior of legal services consumers is irrational .... It is irrational in terms of their own
interest, which is a crucial market failure." Parker, supra note 1, at 1906 (quoting Michael E.
Tiger, 2020 Vision: A Bifocal View, 74 JUDICATURE 89, 92 (1990)). Parties to litigation who
pursue justice until the end may lose, dollarwise, more by successfully winning a final verdict
than if they had settled or compromised. Does that make their decision to go to trial and getjustice irrational? There are dollars, and there are values.
60. Pollock & Felsenthal, supra note 20, at 3.
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swollen civil dockets. On that basis they argue that we can no longer afford
the luxury of our traditional litigation model. Listen to their message: we
simply do not have the time or judicial resources to process and try cases
before judges or juries in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and the Rules of Evidence, i.e. in accordance with long-established ju-
dicial trial quality due process.
Then they make the different argument that we need to increase access to
our courts and make them available to one and all to resolve disputes, great
and small.61 Traditionally, however, we find the Judicial Conference and
individual federal judges urging restraint on the part of Congress in ex-
panding federal jurisdiction. For example, we ask our legislators to make a
judicial impact analysis before opening the federal courthouse door to new,
possibly numerous, federal causes of action.
Let us deal with a few fundamentals. Access to our federal courts for the
great bulk of civil controversies is controlled by Congress. Therefore, I sub-
mit Judge Parker is mistaken when he states that today's federal courthouse
contains significant barriers to entry for most members of society. This is
not so. If there are barriers there, they are Congress' doing, and within cer-
tain constitutional limits, properly so. There is little that the federal courts
can or should do to increase access. Judges deal with the civil cases that
have already gained access to our federal courts. The true access question
that we are dealing with in this debate is whether federal judges are going to
deny the parties to such civil cases access to their "day in court", to the right
to a real trial before a real judge or a real jury in accordance with traditional
due process and equal protection standards? After they come into our court-
house are we going to block their access to the courtroom?
When I hear Judge Parker and Judge Broderick talk about increasing ac-
cess, I am reminded of the proud claim of the leaders of the old Soviet Rus-
sia that its vaunted Socialist society provided access to health and medical
care for all of its citizens, and it did. But what medical and health services
did this wonderful access in fact provide? Reality made a mockery of the
promise. Reality will, at least eventually, override propaganda. It is my
hope that we will not have to go through another ten or twenty years of
mandated experimentation with these court-annexed ADRs to prove the
obvious.
61. Judge Raymond Broderick in his article quoted Judge Irving Kaufman's statement
that our "federal court system has entered a period of crisis . . . with ever burgeoning
caseloads" and then observed that our federal courts are "accessible only to those who could
afford the high cost." Raymond J. Broderick, Yes to Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR, LITIGA-
TION, Summer 1992, at 3. He also quoted Judge Griffin Bell's statement from when Bell was
attorney general that court-annexed compulsory arbitration would "broaden access for the
American people to their justice system." Id. at 4. And Judge Broderick then concludes "we
must face the fact that our federal system of justice has become inaccessible to many. We must
adapt our federal judicial system to the ever-changing conditions of national life to ensure that
every person, regardless of wealth, receives timely redress in our courts." Id. at 60. Unless
Judges Parker, Bell, and Broderick want the Congress to expand federal court jurisdiction,
their "access" point becomes a misuse of language. What their programs do, and are intended
to do, is to burden and to restrict the traditional access of litigants already in court to their
long-cherished day in court before a real judge or a real jury.
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Under Article III of our Constitution, the judicial power of the United
States is vested in the U.S. Supreme Court and the "inferior" federal courts
established by acts of Congress.62 There are strict limitations on the use of
that judicial power by non-article III judges and other persons. The con-
tempt power of Bankruptcy Judges is limited. Highly qualified U.S. Magis-
trate Judges cannot try even regular civil cases without the consent of the
parties, and we go out of our way to make certain such consent is freely
given. If Judge Parker's proposals were fully implemented, the federal judi-
cial power in most civil cases would be delegated out, or sub-contracted, to
non-judges and in some cases to non-lawyers.
The U.S. Congress has great control over the civil jurisdiction of federal
district courts. If it chooses to do away with, or further limit, our broad
diversity jurisdiction, it could. It could permit more federal rights to be as-
serted in state courts. It could establish additional specialized courts in so-
cial security and other areas. It could require more administrative remedies
be exhausted before certain civil cases could be filed in federal court. But if
the Congress chooses to permit certain civil cases to be filed in our federal
courts, does it not thereby express its intent that they be handled and
processed by juries and Article III judges in accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and established
constitutional principles?
Herewith an aside to this discussion: many scholars and some judges
favor doing away with, or severely curtailing, the diversity jurisdiction of our
federal courts as a means of dealing with any overload problems. But most
also realize that political realities make it unlikely that Congress will take
such action. I suggest that they might want to consider installing Judge
Parker's proposal in our federal district courts. Unless someone can prevail
upon state governments to limit trials in their courts through the imposition
of similar mandatory ADR tracks, then those having a choice of federal or
state court will simply opt for, or choose to remain in, the state courts where
they can still get their day in a real court without having to go through any
of these diversions. Voila! A significant reduction in diversity cases! It re-
ally comes down to that "vision thing." Judge Parker and I have different
- radically different - views of what our federal courts are, and should be,
about.
VII. JUDGE PARKER CALLS AND RAISES
If you agree that the present "experimental" mandatory court-annexed
ADR programs unfairly trample upon the rights of "we, the people," con-
sider Judge Parker's proposals. Judge Parker starts by observing that "cur-
rent ADR programs and procedures are... inadequate. ' 63 But he does not
take issue with the procedures used in those programs. Rather he complains
that they are often imposed too late or "after the modem, undisciplined pre-
62. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
63. Parker, supra note 1, at 1910.
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trial practices of lawyers have already run up a substantial bill and produced
significant delay." 64 His major complaint is that decisions rendered by these
mandatory ADR programs are "accorded too little binding authority." 65 So
to him such programs are both too little and too late. He gives the example
of the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania arbitration program which provides
"[i]nformal hearings, with relaxed rules of evidence" after which the arbitra-
tors return a judgment. 66 Then he states, "[a]fter all this, if one of the liti-
gants rejects the arbitrators' decision, she may demand that the court
schedule a full-blown traditional trial - i.e., with no more justification than
dissatisfaction with the results of the arbitrators' particular decision."' 67 It is
difficult to find a statement that more poignantly reveals the differences be-
tween Judge Parker's views and mine. Since the parties have received the
benefits of an informal hearing with relaxed rules of evidence, he in effect
asks, what more could one possibly desire?!
Whereas Judge Broderick and Judge Peckham, in defending the legiti-
macy of their programs, rely most heavily on the "right" of a party dissatis-
fied with the results thereof to demand a real trial before a judge or a jury,
Judge Parker sees that "right" as the major deficiency in those programs.
He acknowledges that in those ADR programs there "exist cost-shifting dis-
incentives" to the making of any demand for a trial de novo, but concludes
that "such disincentives are generally too insignificant to truly discourage
such demands."' 68 So Judge Parker sets out to correct that situation. He
states this must be done if federal courts are fairly to be considered "compre-
hensive justice centers."' 69 Mercy, mercy!
Not only would Judge Parker make his mandatory "tracking" ADRs pub-
lic and tax-supported; 70 not only would he require federal judges to play a
"significantly" more active managerial role and "move our system closer to
an inquisitorial system" of civil dispute resolution in which the real deci-
sionmakers are neither juries nor judges;71 but he would also mandate that
the ADR decisions rendered in his "tracks" be given a "presumption of fi-
nality."' 72 And how, pray, may one overcome this presumption of finality?
Judge Parker assures us that a party's access to a "formalistic" trial will be
"ensured when justified. '73 After a decision is reached "through a non-tradi-
tional track," the litigants would be given a "second procedural safeguard,"
or "another meaningful opportunity to be heard about why they are yet enti-
tled to a traditional trial."'74 At this point the court is called upon to under-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW THE LITIGANTS FARE
IN THE PIrSBURGH ARBITRATION PROGRAM vii (Institute for Civil Justice 1983)).
67. Id.
68. Parker, supra note 1, at 1910.
69. Id. at 1911.
70. Id. at 1905.
71. Id. at 1912-13.
72. Id. at 1914.




take "a cost/benefit-fairness analysis of whether the case warrants the
additional litigant and court resources implicated by the post-decision, tradi-
tional litigation." 75 Judge Parker refers to this hearing as an "exemption
procedure."' 76 He even calls it a "safeguard" for cases "that might have been
inappropriately tracked." 77 In deciding whether to grant the parties a trial,
the court is called upon to consider "the factors analyzed at the tracking
conference, including apparent resource disparity between litigants."7 But,
most importantly, the court is to "consider whether it is likely that a result
substantially different from that reached through the non-traditional track
will be reached by allowing the case to continue through the additional,
traditional litigation track."'79 It is incumbent upon the litigant seeking to
consume still more litigant and judicial resources to "overcome this pre-
sumption against such entitlement." 80 Furthermore, in sharp contrast to the
defensive position taken by Judges Broderick and Peckham, Judge Parker
frankly acknowledges that under his system "a network of incentives and
disincentives should operate to discourage litigants from challenging the pre-
sumption." 8' Thus, post-decision challenges should be relatively few. At a
later point he amplifies on this theme:
Relative cost and delay also work as disincentives for litigants to seek
more process after the presumptively correct decision is rendered pur-
suant to a non-traditional track proceeding. It appears quite likely that
most litigants who have been originally placed on a non-traditional
track will not consider the additional process (benefit) of an traditional
trial worth the additional transaction cost and delay inherent in such
litigation. This seems especially true given that the litigant would have
to overcome a presumption against entitlement to such a trial before she
could start expending the additional time and money associated with
the traditional trial itself.8 2
Judge Parker then states that in formulating his proposal he considered
other more stringent disincentives but decided that, in the light of those al-
ready imposed, such additional disincentives would not be necessary.8 3
So while Judge Broderick's court designed its mandatory court-annexed
arbitration program in a way that would make it economically unfeasible for
a dissatisfied party to seek a trial de novo, Judge Parker has added to such
disincentives a presumption of finality to make it quite certain that few
would actually be able to successfully get the opportunity to have their case
tried before a judge or a jury. At this point please turn to the Constitution
and slowly read Article III, the Fifth Amendment, and the Seventh Amend-
ment. Is the language becoming dimmer?
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1915.




82. Id. at 1917.
83. Parker, supra note 1.
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VIII. JUDGE PARKER'S FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
It is not clear to me how one can fully evaluate Judge Parker's multi-track
proposal without having a detailed explanation of the precise procedures
which would be required in each of his "tracks." It is almost as if he believes
that a careful, precise explanation of his "tracks" is non-essential to a fair
evaluation of his over-all proposal. However, I insist there is no way to fully
evaluate his claim that his "tracks" will produce fair and reliable decisions
without knowing how those tracks work. Still he does tell us just enough to
give as a handle on his basic assumptions.
His "Litigation Track I" postulates a "non-judicial" decisionmaker. 84 We
are told very frankly that "[t]he rules of evidence and the rules of civil proce-
dure would not apply."' 85 The parties and witnesses would just tell their
stories. His "Litigation Track II," we are told, "most resembles what is
known as court-annexed arbitration."' 86 And we know that the arbitrator-
decisionmakers would not be judges.8 7 Since we have a wealth of informa-
tion about such mandatory arbitration programs, we will be able to discuss
the merits thereof. "Litigation Track III" would permit "the submissions of
claims and defenses to a judge or jury" with the information being
"presented in summary form." 88 If a jury is used, "this litigation track most
resembles what is known as the summary jury trial (SJT) developed by
Judge Thomas D. Lambros. '' 89 Since much is known about Summary Jury
Trials we can also evaluate this track. Finally, "Litigation Track IV," his
last, is described by Judge Parker thusly: "Herein lies the traditional jury
trial conception of civil dispute resolution." 90 And, yes, we do understand
our "traditional" litigation model which is the one still used by the over-
whelming majority of our federal trial courts. Thanks be! However, we also
note that if Judge Parker has his way, our traditional litigation model will
also be "reformed pursuant to a significant, comprehensive Civil Justice Re-
form Act plan," the precise terms of which are not spelled out but which
would at a minimum control the type and extent of discovery. 9' Now,
armed with this description of Judge Parker's "Tracks" let us see if these
mandatory ADRs are likely to produce fair and reliable decisions.
In my attacks upon mandatory court-annexed ADR programs, I have
dealt mostly with the mandatory arbitration program which was first estab-
lished in three courts on an experimental basis in 1978.92 I focused on this









92. See Philip D. Frederick, Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration, 68 MICH. B.J. 523, 517
n.1 (1989). Connecticut dropped out early leaving only two "pilots" for the next 6 years. Id.
Eight more courts were added in 1984-1985, bringing the total to ten. Id. at 512, 517 n.3
(listing districts in which court ordered arbitration was operating as of June, 1989).
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other ADR programs in our courts and because much information is avail-
able about that program. And it appears to be the only ADR program that
the Congress has addressed in a substantive manner.
Judge Peckham, in his attack upon the resolution opposing mandatory
ADR's in our federal courts, 93 appears to take the back-up position that
even if the criticisms expressed in the resolution were valid as to the court-
annexed arbitration programs, those criticisms would not apply to other
ADR programs. He states:
Although these criticisms are apparently aimed only at arbitration, the
resolution's broad denunciation of all presumptively mandatory ADR
programs includes within its sweep other varied ADR programs that
bear little resemblance to arbitration and thus are not subject to the
expressed criticisms. For example, in the Northern District of Califor-
nia's presumptively mandatory early neutral evaluation program, cases
are not assigned based on the amount of controversy.
By encompassing all presumptively mandatory ADR programs, the
resolution, perhaps unwittingly, criticizes and calls for an end to
mandatory judicial settlement conferences, an ADR technique com-
monly used by trial judges and which has withstood judicial challenge.
It also seeks to abolish other presumptively mandatory ADR programs
such as mediation and early neutral evaluation. Such presumptively
mandatory ADR procedures are not subject to the criticisms expressed
in the resolution, but the resolution nonetheless seeks to abolish them
with its broad brush. This unfounded and illogical reach of the resolu-
tion is in and of itself reason to reconsider it.94
It is necessary to put one matter to rest. One will note Judge Peckham's
statement that the anti-court-annexed mandatory ADR resolution would
call for an "end to mandatory judicial settlement conferences. ' 95 I assume
this is intended as the Achilles' Heel argument. Judge Peckham believes,
and he may be right, that most judges favor mandatory settlement confer-
ences and, therefore, if I can be identified as opposing such conferences, my
entire opposition to mandatory ADRs will be undercut at least among many
of our fellow federal judges.
Well, I am opposed to mandatory settlement conferences. Indeed our
"Biden Plan" for the federal district courts of Arkansas provides that judges
"will not initiate or order a mandatory settlement conference with the
Court."' 96 I do not believe that the parties to civil lawsuits in our federal
courts should be ordered to discuss settlement with a judge, a magistrate
judge, or any other outsider. 97 But, my opposition to mandatory court-an-
93. See supra part IV.
94. Memorandum, supra note 33, at 2-3 (footnote omitted). I sympathize with Judge
Peckham. As a fair-minded judge he has difficulty using the unadorned term: "mandatory",
so we always find the modifier "presumptively." His justification? The federal judges have the
power to let you out of, or exempt you from, those ADR programs. Suffice to say it is the
judge's call, not the parties!
95. Id. at 3.
96. U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Ark., Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction
Plan 3 (Dec. 30, 1991) (on file with SMU Law Review).
97. Professor Menkel-Meadow observes:
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nexed ADRs goes well beyond my feelings about settlement conferences.
Those who support mandatory court-annexed ADRs seldom discuss in
detail just exactly how those alternatives to a real trial work. Mostly they
are content to describe them with language such as Judge Broderick's
"Speedy Civil Trials"98 and as procedures which produce "fair" and "relia-
ble" decisions, see Judge Parker's assessment. 99 I am here to assert that
none of these alternative procedures can properly be characterized as a
"trial" and none can be counted on to produce "fair" and "reliable" deci-
sions. Why? Because the essential truth revealing procedures and rules of
evidence that we associate with real trials are not required. Unless the true
facts in dispute are reliably established all else is meaningless. I made this
point in an earlier article as follows:
With all due respect, it is not fair to describe ADR programs as only
different in some negligible or unimportant degree from traditional tri-
als in federal courts. They are clearly different in kind and in basic
philosophy. In real trials, the objective is to arrive at the truth, vindi-
cate rights, and to do justice. The evidence presented at a real trial is
all-important. Any experienced trial judge will tell you that it is the
proof and the evidence that determines the outcome of over 95 percent
of the cases and not the eloquence or histrionic talents of the lawyers.
And the procedures, rules, and the evidentiary safeguards incident to
true trials ensure a high degree of reliability with respect to the results
obtained. Not so with ADRs. They operate in a different atmosphere:
where fault, guilt or innocence, right or wrong are not central to the
process; where one-tenth of a loaf is better than none; where the debat-
ing skills of attorneys - and not their real truth-revealing, fact-estab-
lishing trial skills - are glorified; where the evidence is de-emphasized;
where every claim is assumed to have some value; where true justice is
considered too expensive or an unattainable abstraction.1°°
There is a school of thought, especially among some of the "economist"
judges, that it is not important how civil cases are, decided, only that they be
Note here the persistence of the view that such mandatory settlement techniques
do affect court caseloads, despite the empirical evidence to the contrary. The
empirical evidence on the effectiveness of mandatory settlement -conferences in
reducing court dockets does not support a claim that settlement conferences
should be used for efficiency purposes. As a judge and scholar, Judge Posner
raises the efficiency issue by suggesting that if judges spend their time at
mandatory settlement conferences, they may actually reduce court efficiency by
being less available to try cases.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57, at 21 n.98 (citations omitted). The fairness and value of com-
pelling parties and to attend settlement conferences has been questioned. As stated by Judge
Posner, "[t]he broader concern ... is that in their zeal to settle cases judges may ignore the
value of other people's time. One reason people hire lawyers is to economize on their own
investment of time in resolving disputes." G. Heilman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648, 657 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Posner, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook also found
the demonstration of the cost savings weak. Id. at 664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). My view
is based on principle: Federal judges should not intrude into the settlement business unless
invited by all parties.
98. Broderick, supra note 31, at 218.
99. Parker, supra note 1, at 1921.
100. G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 75
JUDICATURE 34, 36 (1991).
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decided. That view tears at the very fabric of our American democratic soci-
ety. If the instruments of justice are not intended and designed to find the
truth and bring about a just result, and are not so perceived, we are indeed in
trouble. The economists must realize that there are certain values in our
democratic society that must be accepted and may not be tampered with
even in the name of efficiency.
I have demonstrated elsewhere the fundamental deficiencies of the court-
annexed arbitration programs by quoting provisions of the local rules
adopted by the Western District of Missouri, 0 1 and the district of New
Jersey's Guidelines. 10 2 In 1992 the Federal Judicial Center published its
"Manual For Litigation Management and Cost and Delay Reduction"
which includes Rule 43 from the Western District of Oklahoma. 0 3 The
Western District of Oklahoma, like the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,'0
uses the $100,000 cut-off figure, above which cases are not forced into arbi-
tration.10 5 And, like others, it uses lawyers to act as its arbitrators. 0 6 Any
attorney who has been admitted to practice five years or more, is admitted to
practice in that district court, and who is determined by the Court "to be
competent to perform the duties of an arbitrator" is eligible for selection. l07
The arbitrators are considered "independent contractors." 0 8 Those selected
are not barred from practicing in that court, 10 9 and it is assumed that they
would not be precluded from representing clients before other lawyer-arbi-
trators."10 They are paid $150 per day or part thereof for hearings in which
they participate as an arbitrator or as a member of an arbitration panel."I '
They submit vouchers for payment by the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts "for compensation and transportation expenses."' "l 2
Rule 43(G)(5) provides:
5. Default of Party. Subject to the provisions of this Rule, the hearing
shall proceed on the noticed date. Absence of a party shall not be
101. See id. That court's rule states that "[t]he presentation of testimony shall be kept to a
minimum. Each party's representation to the arbitrators should be primarily through the
statements and arguments of counsel." W.D. Mo. R. 30 (H)(5). The Clerk of the Western
District of Missouri advises that that court stopped assigning cases to their arbitration pro-
gram in 1991 and the last arbitration was completed in March 1993. The court now has an
early evaluation program.
102. See, Eisele, supra note 100, at 36. The Guideline states that "[i]n a general sense, the
Court envisions this presentation process to be somewhat similar to a combination of opening
and closing arguments augmented by live testimony where necessary to aid the arbitrator's
fact-finding function." U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of N.J., Guidelines for Arbitration 5
(Dec. 19, 1991) (on file with SMU Law Review).
103. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR LITIGATION MANAGEMENT AND COST
AND DELAY REDUCTION 109 (1992).
104. E.D. Pa. R. 8(3)(A).











grounds for a continuance but damages shall be awarded against an
absent party only upon presentation of proof thereof satisfactory to the
arbitrator(s). Failure to appear by a person required to be present or
other failure to participate in good faith may constitute a default in
accordance with Local Rule 17(E). In such instances, the hearing shall
proceed and the arbitrator(s) shall enter an award. Upon a report of
absence or other noncompliance with this Rule, or, on the motion of
opposing counsel, appropriate action may be taken by the Court.11 3
Rule 43 (I) provides in part:
(I) Attendance at and Conduct of Hearing.
(1) In addition to lead counsel who will try the case for each party, a
person with actual settlement authority must likewise be present for the
hearing. This will be the parties if natural persons, or representatives of
parties which are not natural persons, but may not be counsel (except
in-house counsel) or a person who is not directly or actively associated
with the party or parties. Other interested parties such as insurers or
indemnifiers shall attend and are subject to the provisions of this Rule.
Only the assigned Judge may excuse attendance by any attorney, party,
or party's representative.
(2) Hearings are intended to last approximately two to two and one-
half hours. Counsel for each party shall have up to one hour to com-
municate the highlights of his or her case. Plaintiff(s) will be permitted
to reserve a limited time for rebuttal. In the case of multiple parties and
multiple claims, adjustments are made at the discretion of the
arbitrator.
(3) The hearing shall be conducted informally. All evidence shall be
presented through counsel who may incorporate argument on such evi-
dence in his or her presentation. The Federal Rules of Evidence shall
be a guide, but shall not be binding. Counsel may present factual repre-
sentations supportable by reference to discovery materials, including
depositions, stipulations, signed statements of witnesses, or other docu-
ments or by a professional representation that counsel personally spoke
with the witness and is repeating what the witness stated. Statements,
reports, and depositions may be read from, but not at undue length.
Physical evidence, including documents, may be exhibited during a
presentation. "14
The arbitrators have the power to make awards but are not required to issue
an opinion explaining the award." 15 Rule 43 makes an effort to insulate the
arbitration hearing from any subsequent trial de novo. It states that "[iun
the absence of agreement of the parties, and except as provided in this Rule,
no transcript of the hearing shall be admissible in evidence at any subsequent
de novo trial of the action." 16 The rule continues:
(2) Limitation on Admission of Evidence. At a trial de novo, the
Court shall not admit any evidence that there has been an arbitration







concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding unless the evi-
dence would otherwise be admissible in the Court under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, or the parties have otherwise stipulated. 117
If a person still insists on a trial after the arbitrator's award, he must first
deposit with the clerk an amount equal to the arbitrators' fees.s18 Rule 43
(P)(4) provides:
(4) Return of Deposited Fees. Upon application within fifteen days of
the entry of a final judgment, the sum so deposited shall be returned to
the party demanding the trial de novo, if
(a) the party demanding the trial de novo obtains a final judgment,
exclusive of interest and costs, more favorable than the arbitration
award, or
(b) the Court determines that the demand for trial de novo was made
for good cause.
In the event that the moving party does not obtain a more favorable
result and the sum so deposited is not returned to the moving party,
such sum shall be paid to the Treasury of the United States.' 19
So we see that the arbitration hearing is conducted before non-judicial
independent contractors, the right of cross-examination is gone, and the role
of evidence becomes secondary. The whole objective is to drastically shorten
the proceeding. Note that the guidelines from the Western District of Mis-
souri candidly state:
An arbitration hearing is an opportunity to present informally the es-
sence of a dispute. An arbitration hearing should not be conducted like
a formal trial. Each party's presentation should not last more than 2
1/2 hours.
A party's presentation should be a combination of opening statement
and closing argument supplemented by evidence. A party is not re-
quired to call any witnesses. However, a party may call witnesses, but
the time allotted to that party should not be enlarged solely because
witnesses were present. 120
What lawyer would state that what happens at one of these court-annexed
arbitration hearings is a trial?' 2 ' As I have said before, any judge who re-
117. W.D. Okla. R. 43 (P)(2). One can reasonably question the efficacy and effectiveness of
such language. I doubt that such a Chinese Wall can, or should, be erected. If a party makes a
damaging admission at the arbitration hearing in an affidavit or otherwise would the local rule
override the Federal Rules of Evidence or the due process rights of the litigant to submit that
evidence to the trier of fact at the real, "de novo" trial? The reality is that these mandatory
ADRs in effect compel the preliminary disclosure of information and trial tactics contrary to
the discovery rules which, in turn, can compromise the effectiveness of any actual trial that
may follow on. Furthermore, holding back, that is failing to fully participate in the ADR
proceeding, may bring sanctions. Of course, if the effectiveness of the trial is prejudiced or
compromised by the ADR proceeding that in itself may induce settlement - which is the
principal objective of those requiring such diversions.
118. Id. 43(P)(3).
119. Id. 43(P)(4).
120. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Mo., Guidelines for Arbitration.
121. I am not alone in understanding the crucial differences between trials and arbitration.
Note Justice Black's statement in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox:
For the individual, whether his case is settled by a professional arbitrator or
tried by a jury can make a crucial difference. Arbitration differs from judicial
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quires a trial before him or her to be conducted in accordance with such
rules would not only be summarily reversed on appeal, but would probably
be considered as a proper candidate for impeachment.
Indeed, court-annexed arbitration is surely giving traditional arbitration a
bad name. This is because the objectives of the two procedures are different.
Traditional arbitration may go to some lengths to establish the true facts, but
that would defeat the purpose of court-annexed arbitration. If court-an-
nexed ADRs are not limited in time and procedure, they may last as long as
trials. Therefore, if one's only justification for such diversions in the first
place is the alleged reduction in costs and delays, we have a problem, don't
we? The moral is that if ADRs are kept out of our courts and are voluntary,
they have a much greater chance of being effective.
Coerced settlement is the primary objective of these compulsory court-
annexed ADRs despite protests to the contrary. For instance, Judge Broder-
ick states that the mandatory arbitration program in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania "was not designed primarily as a settlement program."'122 But
he undercuts this contention when he explains his court's reason for adopt-
ing a maximum dollar cut-off figure.' 2 3 Under all such mandatory pro-
grams, if the amount of money the plaintiff is legitimately seeking is more
than the cut-off figure, then the case may not be ordered into the arbitration
program. If, however, the figure is below the cut-off figure then the case is
mandatorily forced into the program. How did the judges of the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania arrive at the cut-off figure? Let me quote from
Judge Broderick:
It was generally agreed that there should be some limitation on the
amount in controversy. It was conceded that in cases where money
damages only are being sought, the amount in controversy should be
limited to an amount which might make it economically unfeasible for
litigants to demand a trial de novo. The savings to the litigants, as well
as to the courts is not realized whenever the amount in controversy
encourages the losing party to demand a trial de novo. It was therefore
determined to limit the amount in controversy to $75,000 in order to
avoid the possibility of making the arbitration program just one more
layer of litigation. 12 4
So where "big money" is sought, the parties are entitled to their traditional
day in court unencumbered with this costly arbitration diversion. This is not
so if the claim is relatively small. The court picked a figure which it felt
would make it economically unfeasible for a party who was dissatisfied with
proceedings in many ways: arbitration carries no right to a jury trial as guaran-
teed by the Seventh Amendment; arbitrators need not be instructed in the law;
they are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not give reasons for their
awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the record of proceedings need not be
complete; and judicial review, it has been held, is extremely limited.
379 U.S. 663, 664 (1965).
122. Broderick, supra note 31, at 218.
123. This cutoff figure was originally $75,000, but was later raised to $ 100,000. Id. at 220;
see E.D.PA. R. Civ. P. 8.3.A.
124. Broderick, supra note 31, at 220.
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the arbitration award to then demand a trial de novo. The court has con-
sciously constructed a tangible and effective disincentive aimed at the dissat-
isfied party. But it will more certainly discourage the poorer parties - those
with limited resources. 125 By the time the arbitration award is entered, the
parties will have already paid, or become liable for, the expense and legal
fees incident to this ADR procedure. One who decides to ask for a trial de
novo must then pay his or her lawyer again for preparing for and conducting
the real trial. And if that party does not get a more favorable result at the
trial than at the arbitration hearing, he or she will also be liable for the
arbitrators fees for conducting an arbitration hearing that he did not want or
ask for. In addition, if he holds back or skimps in order to save fees and
expenses at the arbitration hearing, he or she may be exposed to additional
sanctions on the ground that the party did not "participate in the arbitration
process in a meaningful manner." 126 Thus a real catch-22 situation occurs
because the rule requires you to use what may very well be limited resources
at the arbitration hearing, which, in turn, will discourage you from later
demanding a trial de novo. This is sad, sad indeed.
I have discussed these mandatory court-annexed arbitration programs in
such detail precisely because Judge Parker has not chosen to do so. These
ADR programs are the heart of his track system. It is those programs that,
in his reformation model, are going to provide whatever justice the parties to
civil cases are likely to get in his federal court. 127 Can they be counted on
the produce fair and reliable decisions?
Judge Parker's "Litigation Track III permits the submission of claims and
defenses to a judge or jury without the cost and delay associated with the
traditional jury trial."' 128 He states that it resembles summary jury trials
(SJT) as developed by Judge Tom Lambros of the Northern District of
Ohio. 129 Under this procedure, each party may present the substance of its
case before a six-person jury selected from the regular jury pool. 1 30 As de-
scribed by Professor Leo Levin:
Each side is given one hour to summarize the evidence it would be pre-
pared to present at trial. The judge then instructs the jurors on the law,
and they retire to deliberate. While a consensus verdict is encouraged,
125. Indeed, some critics have argued that ADR actually hurts those who are less
powerful in our society - like women or racial and ethnic minorities - by
leaving them unprotected by formal rules and procedures in situations where
informality permits the expression of power and domination that is unmediated
by legal restraints. In other criticisms, proceduralists have argued that various
forms of ADR compromise our legal system by privatizing law making, shifting
judicial roles, compromising important legal and political rights and principles,
and failing to grant parties the benefits of hundreds of years of procedural pro-
tections afforded by our civil and criminal justice rules.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57, at 11 (citations omitted).
126. E.D. Pa. R. 8(5)(C).
127. Parker, supra note 1, at 1911.
128. Id. at 1916.
129. Id.
130. See Thomas D. Lambros & Thomas H. Skunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 43, 47-48 (1980).
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if the jurors fail to agree they may instead report their individual views.
The verdict is not binding; its purpose is to provide a basis for settle-
ment discussions.13 1
As of June 1992, twelve courts were using SJTs. 132
Judge Parker, quoting Judge Jon Newman, expresses concern for the ju-
rors - "the conscripted participants" - in our present system.133 But sum-
mary jury trials use real, subpoenaed, jurors to participate, not in a real trial,
but in an advisory role as part of a settlement effort for which neither the
parties nor the prospective jurors volunteered.134 And in many such pro-
grams, the jurors, who are there upon orders of the court, and who are away
from their families and businesses, are not even informed that the "verdict"
they are called upon to render will not be binding. 135 Talk about
conscription!136
Court-annexed mandatory summary jury trials suffer from the same vices
and inadequacies as court-annexed mandatory arbitration (as discussed in
detail above) and then some. Judicial quality due process and the Rules of
Evidence are not mandated; there is no, or limited, cross examination; the
evidence is secondary; and as acknowledged by all, summary jury trials are
not "trials," but settlement devices.
Judge Feikens speaks my language when he says:
The Federal Judicial Center is sending judges and lawyers around the
country to judicial conferences to preach the use of summary jury trials
as an effective way of delivering justice in the quickest possible time at
the lowest possible cost ....
The parties are required to submit to a procedure to which the rules
of evidence and civil procedure do not apply. In the fifteen minute pres-
entation the lawyers can say anything about their cases. Procedures
designed to achieve a just result are ignored. No longer is the judicial
process dealing with probabilities. There is no burden of proof. Rele-
vancy is not a factor. Neither is credibility - the jury sees and hears no
witnesses. How can the jury in this aborted procedure factor into the
result the values of the community? It is the use of Russian roulette to
achieve a disposition of a case. 137
Although Judge Parker has not dwelt on the details of his four tracks, we
can see that three of them are nothing more or less than the old mandatory
ADRs with which we are all familiar. The only difference is he would im-
pose them earlier and with even less discovery than similar ADRs presently
enjoy, and he would remove the right of a de novo trial and provide in lieu
131. Levin & Golash, supra note 55, at 38.
132. House Studies Alternate Dispute Resolution, supra note 27, at 5.
133. Parker, supra note 1, at 1908 (quoting Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspec-
tions on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644 (1985)).
134. Levin & Golash, supra note 54, at 38-39.
135. Id.
136. See Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (holding
that federal courts may not conscript citizens to serve as jurors in summary jury trials because
it is not authorized by law).
137. The Honorable John Feikens, The Civil Jury - An Endangered Species, 20 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 789, 794 (1987).
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thereof an opportunity to convince a very skeptical self-interested judge that
there is a need to expend yet additional litigant and judicial resources on the
case. 13
8
Judge Parker argues that the reviewability of his ADR track decisions
might be just enough due process to save them.
Whatever the court's adjudication at the post-decision, traditional trial
entitlement hearing, the ruling and the reasons underlying it must be
placed in the record. The court's adjudication in this respect should be
reviewable according to the clearly erroneous standard. This same
standard of review should apply to the final decision rendered through
any non-traditional track. 39
Ironically, one of the criticisms of the use of juries in civil cases is that their
general verdicts do not report their factual findings, making appellate review
problematical. 40 Nevertheless, the court's instructions as to the law, cou-
pled with the jury's verdict, when reviewed in the light of a complete tran-
script and record of all of the testimony and evidence, will reveal the critical
factual findings. Now compare the jury verdict with the decisions made in
Judge Parker's first three tracks. Those decisions are in the form of a simple
award or a denial thereof. We are not sure if there will be an electronic or
stenographic record of the ADR proceeding. Even if there is, that record
will not permit an honest application of the clearly erroneous doctrine be-
cause the decision cannot be checked against the real evidence.
Furthermore, what is to guide the appellate court's application of the
abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the lower court's tract assign-
ment and exemption decisions? Remember the original tracking decisions
are to be based upon "apparent case complexity[,] ... the need for informa-
tion exchange (disclosure) and/or discovery, . . .the relative financial re-
sources of the parties[,] ... public policy externalties[,] and ... whether the
case involves novel questions of law or fact."' 141 If a party demands an "ex-
emption" hearing, "the court would conduct the hearing and listen to the
arguments for and against the expenditure of additional litigant and court
resources on the case."' 4 2 For instance, Judge Parker, states, "Moreover,
the court might find that the demanding party is attempting to 'bully' the
other with her superior financial and legal resources" and therefore "had not
demonstrated her entitlement to the traditional trial."' 143
I ask, how could that tracking decision be reviewed by an appellate court
under either the clearly erroneous rule or the abuse of discretion doctrine?
What kind of record would exist? We can see that one party is claiming that
the other is simply bullying because of that party's superior financial and
138. Parker, supra note 1, at 1914-15.
139. Id. at 1919.
140. See Kevin C. Kennedy, We Need a Fresh Start: Repeal the Seventh Amendment, 1991
DET. C. L. REV. 1289, 1291 (citing Edward Devitt, Federal Civil Jury Trials Should Be Abol-
ished, 60 A.B.A. J. 570 (1974)).
141. Parker, supra note 1, at 1914.




legal resources. Would the record reflect anything other than the argument?
Would the parties have to develop the evidence on the disparity of financial
and legal resources? What if the party with superior resources contended
that the other party was asking for a trial in order to extort money from it?
Would there be a full evidentiary hearing on that issue which could be re-
viewed?' 44 In sum, reviewability in the context of Judge Parker's ADR
tracks is meaningless. Since the underlying proceedings are fundamentally
flawed, no review by an appellate court can save them.
Judge Parker tries to reassure our federal appellate judges that there
should be few appeals under his system and that "the reformation model's
procedural regime should not generate a new onslaught of appellate is-
sues."' 145 I disagree. The presently existing experimental mandatory court-
annexed programs are already generating a plethora of conflicting appellate
decisions. 146 Just imagine the issues his system would raise!
IX. THE TRADITIONAL FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT
The number of federal district courts which have installed mandatory
ADRs is still small. So, now, for the dual purposes of contrast and compari-
son let us examine how many "traditional" federal courts still operate in the
United States in 1993. Most federal trial judges recognize that they should
be devoting their time and efforts to the task of bringing the cases on their
dockets to a condition of trial readiness as quickly as is reasonable and then
to the task of promptly trying those cases that are not settled or disposed of
upon motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Most judges do not
badger or cajole the parties or their attorneys into settlement, but most do
encourage the parties to discuss settlement and try to remove impediments
to settlement by, for example, the early resolution of questions of law.
The Eastern District of Arkansas, my district, does not initiate or order
144. I have asked what judges do if they do not try cases. If Judge Parker's reformation
model is installed, the answer is clear. They will be busy, busy, busy with track assignment
conferences, exemption conferences, and other satellite hearings. I suggest they could better
spend their time by dealing with the "real thing" - bringing cases to trial readiness and then
trying them. Remember, there will not be many to try (maybe 5%) because good attorneys
and their clients are going to settle most of the cases that should be settled, without any coer-
cion or involvement from the court.
145. Parker, supra note 1, at 1920.
146. Professor Menkel-Meadow observes:
Skillful lawyers are raising legitimate claims regarding the constitutionality of
some of the aspects of ADR - such as infringements of the right to a jury trial,
separation of powers, due process, and equal protection. Other claims which
may not be as legitimate - such as refusing to participate in arbitration by
claiming that it is coerced discovery - demonstrate that ADR has become just
another battleground for adversarial fighting rather than multi-dimensional
problem-solving.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 57, at 17. For some of the more interesting cases, see Strandel v.
Jackson, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky.
1988); Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); Federal Reserve
Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v.
Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (6-5 en banc); Hume v. M & C Management,
129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. v. G.E. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th
Dir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1033 (1989).
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settlement conferences. But my scheduling order provides, inter alia, that
"[t]he Court will expect the attorneys to explore every possibility of settle-
ment well in advance of the trial date and to notify the Court... promptly if
cases are settled."' 147 Furthermore, the Eastern District of Arkansas has just
published a pamphlet entitled Your Day In Court: The Federal Court Expe-
rience, which each litigant and each attorney in every civil case must read. 148
That booklet encourages settlement and explains the many options available
including the voluntary use of ADR programs:
If your case meets the jurisdictional requirements, states a legally
valid claim, and has genuine issues of material fact, then you are consti-
tutionally guaranteed the right to a civil trial, and you will not be forced
to give up that right. However, it may be in your best interest to settle
your lawsuit voluntarily, without going to trial. This might be cheaper
and easier for everyone. Give close attention to your lawyer's recom-
mendations in this matter. Ultimately, though, it is you who must de-
cide whether or not to settle, and you need not apologize if you do insist
on "your day in court." That is your right.
Your attorney and the opposing party's attorney may be able to work
out terms for a settlement that are agreeable to both sides. This type of
informal negotiated settlement is the most common and familiar way
your suit can be resolved without trial. However, if it looks as though
that route might be unsatisfactory, you can use a more formal Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution (ADR) technique or program to help you set-
tle. Some means of ADR settlement are binding - that is, they result
in a decision both sides must accept. Some are non-binding - they
result in findings more like advice, and either party may take it or leave
it. All involve a neutral third party who evaluates the case and helps
guide it to resolution. However, the different ADR methods vary in the
amount of control that the neutral third party has. ADR techniques
are variable and flexible, letting the parties and their attorneys design an
effective, efficient, and private resolution of their dispute. But usually
they are not cost-free. Indeed, some may be very expensive. Discuss
these pros and cons with your attorney.
For more detail on ADR, please see the Additional Information sec-
tion at the end of this booklet. Note that this court has consciously
rejected mandatory ADR because it believes it is important to uphold
your right to have your case tried to a jury or a judge. Nevertheless,
ADR remains a voluntary option which, if chosen, might save time,
money, and anxiety.149
The booklet also provides information concerning mediation, early neutral
evaluation, summary jury trials, mini-trials, and arbitration in the "Addi-
tional Information" section of the pamphlet.1 50
Once a case is filed in the Eastern District of Arkansas it is no longer
147. Anton Farms v. Hoechst-Roussel Agri-Vet Co., No. 92-0451 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17,
1992) (scheduling order).
148. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. AND W. DISTS. OF ARK., YOUR DAY IN COURT: THE
FEDERAL COURT EXPERIENCE (1992).
149. Id. at 15-16.
150. Id. at 25-26.
1964 [Vol. 46
COMMENT ON PARKER
considered solely the property of the litigants. The court has an obligation
to take control of each case early and to follow that case through to trial.
Still, the most important, indispensable, element is setting the trial. The cer-
tainty of a real trial on a fixed date is the engine that makes the system work
both well and efficiently.
Simply put, I believe I was appointed to serve as a trial judge in a trial
court. I find great satisfaction in that role. I do not understand those trial
judges who appear to believe that every trial represents a failure of the sys-
tem. I believe and accept that some cases should be tried. Principle should
be vindicated, truth ascertained and determined, rights established and de-
clared, extortion resisted, and justice - pure justice - done, at least
occasionally.
In taking on this fight, I believe I am speaking for the citizens and inhabit-
ants of this land. I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we law
professionals - and particularly a few of us federal judges - have, albeit
with the best of motives and intentions, done more to erode, than to protect,
the rights of the people of this nation. And I suspect that, perhaps subcon-
sciously, we have let our own self-interest in pressuring parties into settle-
ments affect our judgment about the merits of these involuntary court-
annexed ADR programs. I personally know and greatly admire many of my
fellow judges who so ardently and sincerely support the opposite side of this
debate. But the issues are too important to permit me to keep my peace. As
I said in connection with the Sentencing Guidelines, it is unfortunate, but
true, that we are more likely to lose the benefits of our constitutional form of
government through the acts of our friends than from the acts of our ene-
mies. This is because of the acts of well-intentioned, well-motivated people
who, through their myopic support of some lesser goal, unwittingly undercut
the larger, broader principles of our national life.
There is a place for alternate dispute resolution programs in our society,
but they should not be mandatory and they should not be in, or annexed to,
our federal district courts. They should truly be alternatives to, and not a
part of, the litigation process. The ADR movement is apparently thriving
and that is good. Voluntary out-of-court ADR programs are not only con-
sistent with, but, indeed, complement, our existing due process, evidentiary-
based federal trial system. We simply urge the ADR folks to do their thing
on their own turf.
I have emphasized the vast difference in values and visions between the
opponents and proponents of these mandatory court-annexed ADR pro-
grams reflecting our differing views concerning litigation and the proper role
of our federal district courts. Justice Black, discussing a similar conflict in
philosophy with his brother judges, stated:
There is also, apparently a vast difference between their philosophy and
mine concerning litigation and the role of courts in our country. At
least since Magna Carta people have desired to have a system of courts
with set rules of procedure of their own and with certain institutional
assurances of fair and unbiased resolution of controversies. It was in
Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights, and other such charters of
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liberty, that there originally was expressed in the English-speaking
world a deep desire of people to be able to settle differences according to
standard, well-known procedures in courts presided over by independ-
ent judges with jurors taken from the public. Because of these deep-
seated desires, the right to sue and be sued in courts according to the
"law of the land," known later as "due process of law," became recog-
nized. That right was written into the Bill of Rights of our Constitution
and in the constitutions of the States.' 5 1
X. THE POPULARITY ARGUMENT: WE LOVE TO BE
COERCED! REALLY?
In support of their "popularity rationale" for mandatory court-annexed
ADRs, Judges Parker, Peckham and Schwarzer rely on Ms. Barbara
Meierhoefer's work, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Ten District Courts pub-
lished in 1990.152 The principal data for her evaluation were the survey re-
sponses of some 3,501 lawyers, 723 parties, and 62 judges.' 53 Her primary
objective was to determine whether litigants viewed arbitration as a form of
second class justice. 154 She acknowledged that much of her information was
"attitudinal" because it was what respondents believed to have been accom-
plished.155 Her study did not address how much time the programs saved
litigants and the courts.' 56 Indeed, cost and time savings were not reported
by the majority of attorneys in cases where trial de novo was demanded. 157
Ms. Meierhoefer's case samples generally covered an eighteen month time
frame within the 1985-1986 period. 158
Ms. Meierhoefer reports that "the large majority of judges in the pilot
courts support their own program," but they shared "no widely held view
about what characteristics constitute a good program." 159 She also reports
that the strength of the judges' positive attitudes varied significantly with the
strength of their conviction that the program "reduces their caseload bur-
den."'160 Thus, since ninety-seven percent of those sixty-two judges agreed
that their burden was reduced by the program, they tended to think those
programs were just wonderful. 16' How revealing!
Why would those judges not like their own programs? After all, they
voted to install them in their courts, so they have a vested interest in them,
which they emphatically make known to the attorneys who practice before
them. That these judges do not agree on what constitutes a good program is
also understandable because their primary interest is not in the merits of the
151. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 669 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting).
152. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 29.




157. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 29, at 85.
158. Id. at 22.





programs, but in the effect of those programs in inducing settlements and
clearing their civil dockets. The judges like them precisely because they co-
erce settlements. I would wager that very few, if any, of the judges polled
had ever witnessed one of their own court-annexed arbitrations. So when
the ADR advocates say the judges "like" those programs, remember that
those same judges are mandatary ADR advocates themselves; that they have
made a commitment to such programs and, therefore, have their reputations
on the line; that they have a personal interest in pressuring settlements; and
that they insist that the lawyers in their districts understand that the judges
are strongly behind these programs and expect the bar to accept them and
fall in line.
Which brings us to the lawyers. How many lawyers are willing to stand
up to, and vocally oppose, the judges of their federal district courts? Some,
but, alas, not many. Furthermore, what self-interests do these programs
serve for lawyers? It is my belief that these mandatory ADR programs bring
lawyers into these courts who would not otherwise feel competent to venture
into such arenas. Experienced judges know that the challenge of trying real
cases before judges and juries acts as a natural selection process. Those who
find they can handle it, and are good at it, generally develop into able and
effective trial lawyers. The others will drop out and pursue less stressful
legal careers. Good trial lawyers are a breed apart. We federal judges know
that a small percentage of those attorneys enrolled in our courts will be in-
volved in a majority of the civil cases coming before us. I estimate that fewer
than 250 lawyers will appear in 75% of the civil cases in my court. Most of
the rest avoid real trial work.
But if these mandatory ADRs are served up as an alternative to real trials,
lawyers with limited trial skills will start appearing more and more fre-
quently because such programs are not very demanding and certainly do not
require the marvelous truth-revealing talents of real trial lawyers. An attor-
ney can process one of these ADRs with much less time and effort and can
therefore handle a much greater volume of cases if real trials can be
avoided. 162 Just let the arbitrators decide, recommend that your client ac-
cept their award, and move on to the next arbitration proceeding. The pay-
off is probably there, especially for the poor or mediocre trial lawyer. After
all, one can, by using such procedures, turn over a much greater volume of
cases with much less work per case.
Finally, we are told that the parties - the litigants - like these
mandatory ADR programs.163 Really? If so, why do they not voluntarily
enter those programs? Note that Ms. Meierhoefer relied upon survey re-
sponses from 723 parties.164 She was able to contact only 46% of her target
sample and from this group got a 59% response rate.1 65 The cases of 46%
162. Sadly, I believe courts having these ADR programs will attract cases with little or no
merit, that is, cases that would otherwise not be filed, on the theory that in the ADR process
some value will be assigned to the case if for no other reason than to get rid of it.
163. MEIERHOEFER, supra note 29, at 63-65.
164. Id. at 2.
165. Id. at 55.
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of her party respondents closed before the arbitration hearing. 66 Only one
third of her party respondents were individuals; the rest were corporations or
those sued in their business or public capacities!167 About one third of the
parties "had no personal participation in any event concerning the case on
which they reported, ' 168 while the number who reported involvement in
court trials was only 3%. 169 Therefore, I question how much confidence can
we place in Judge Parker's reliance upon this study, when he states:
As we have said, this track most resembles what is known now as
court-annexed arbitration. It is likely that the litigants will be quite
satisfied with the process they receive pursuant to this non-traditional
litigation track. As the Federal Judicial center reported to Congress (in
fulfillment of the former's obligation to evaluate the performance of the
mandatory, court-annexed, non-binding arbitration programs statuto-
rily created by Congress in 1988): "Eighty percent of all parties in cases
mandatorily referred to arbitration agreed that the procedures used to
handle their cases were fair .... "170
Let us be fair. A party's reaction to, and perception of, these ADR pro-
grams will ordinarily be controlled by his or her attorney's opinions. After
all, few parties have any independent basis in training or experience to judge
these procedures or to compare them with real trials. If an attorney tells a
client that ADR is just like a trial but quicker and less expensive, that client
will probably accept that opinion if he or she has had no prior experience
with real trials. If you do not know the difference between a diamond and a
zircon, and someone who is supposed to know tells you they are the same,
you will probably accept that opinion as true. The lay-client relies on the
attorney's advice.
So when one seeks the opinions of parties, judges, and attorneys who use
these mandatory court-annexed procedures, one must critically evaluate the
answers received in the light of the knowledge and motivations of the re-
spondents. Additionally, so much depends on what questions are asked and
how they are framed. Although I am sure Ms. Meierhoefer attempted to be
very careful and objective in conducting her study, I do not have that same
confidence in the Federal Judicial Center.
Is it fair to impugn the objectivity of the Federal Judicial Center on this
issue? Is it appropriate in assessing the value and persuasiveness of its publi-
cations to note the bias and pre-conceived positions of those who run that
show, particularly if they profess to scientific objectivity? Surely judges and
trial lawyers - at least those who can recall trying cases in court - will say,
"of course."
Late last Fall, the Federal Judicial Center sent a "Planning For the Fu-
166. Id.
167. Id. at 56.
168. Id. at 54.
169. Id. at 56.
170. Parker, supra note 1, at 1918 (quoting MEIERHOEFER, supra note 29, at 119-20).
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ture" questionnaire to all United States District Judges. 171 The section on
"Methods of Civil Dispute Resolution" asks the respondent to indicate on a
range of one to five the extent of agreement or disagreement with seven dif-
ferent statements or propositions. 172 The terms "voluntary," "involuntary,"
"mandatory," or "at the request of or with the consent of the parties" are
nowhere to be found in the questionnaire. Let me quote a few of the
statements:
11.1 The role of the federal courts in civil cases should be to resolve
disputes through traditional litigation only.
11.3 ADR procedures should be used by federal courts in civil cases
because in some cases they produce fairer outcomes than traditional
litigation.
11.4 ADR should be used by federal courts only to prevent lengthy
delays in terminating cases.
173
In the first statement, what is meant by "traditional litigation?" If litigation
means "trials" then, of course, no one would support the idea that cases
should only be resolved through trials when everyone knows that approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of all cases will be resolved without trials even in
the absence of ADR programs. And we know that most federal courts en-
courage settlement and remove roadblocks to settlement by promptly ruling
on pending motions and resolving questions of law. The second and third
statements in the questionnaire speak of the use of ADRs without specifying
whether the reference is to voluntary or involuntary ADRs. Thus, the key
issue of coerciveness is avoided. Despite those problems, I fully expect the
"returns" from the Center's questionnaire will soon be used to further fuel
the push to establish mandatory ADRs in our United States District Courts.
I am aware of another way judges can increase the "popularity" of ADRs
among lawyers and litigants. With a little indirection let me explain. The
Rand Corporation study noted the "significant reduction" in the number of
trials, proportioned to the number of cases filed, but reached no conclusions
about the reason for the trend.174 Judge Schwarzer opined that it might be
because of the burgeoning criminal case load, saying "Civil cases may be
getting squeezed out."'1 75 He went on to state that "[t]rials are very expen-
sive and burdensome .... If the parties can find a way of disposing of their
dispute without a trial, that's good. If the dispute cannot be disposed of
after all reasonable efforts and the parties cannot get to trial, that's bad."
176
How revealing? It is true that each of us federal judges can drive litigants
and their attorneys to seek some, almost any, alternative to the "traditional
litigation track." We can do this by simply not doing our job properly - by
letting our civil dockets collapse, by permitting unconscionable delays, or in
17 1. Federal Judicial Center, Planning for the Future, Questionnaire (Fall 1991) (available
from Federal Judicial Center, Wash. D.C.).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Pollock & Felsenthal, supra note 20, at 3.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
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sum, by not moving and trying cases in a prompt and orderly fashion so that
the parties can get to trial within a reasonable time. I submit, however, that
if we federal judges do our jobs, move and try our cases, and keep our civil
dockets current, litigants and their attorneys will rarely, voluntarily seek any
of those alternatives. Frankly, this is no time for modesty. People will
choose the diamond over the zircon if they know the difference. When all is
said and done, these mandatory ADR advocates have nothing to offer that
can compare with the effectiveness of, or indeed the majesty of, a properly
conducted trial before a real judge or a real jury in accordance with our
traditional evidentiary and due process standards if the objective is to find
and establish the true facts, - the truth; to properly apply the controlling
law; to vindicate rights and principle; and to do justice.
Parties who choose to bring their cases to federal court have opted for a
judicial resolution of their controversy. They could have chosen to utilize
some voluntary ADR program. This may help explain why once in court,
parties almost never voluntarily enter a court-annexed program. They filed
their claim in court to get their day in court. That is what they want. And
there is a further explanation that seems to elude ADR advocates. In many
cases one side is in the right under the law and true facts, and the other is
not. Where the facts are not clear, the law is not clear, or the equities are
less one sided, cases are much more likely to settle, and usually do - with-
out the aid of mandatory ADRs. Therefore, forcing cases into this coercive
regime may jeopardize justice, sacrifice principle, and reward extorters. No,
it is not enough that cases be resolved; they should be resolved justly. And
the unencumbered right to a trial before a judge or a jury is the engine that
makes our civil justice system work better to achieve this end than any other
yet devised.
Here it is necessary to say something in support of that vanishing breed:
the well-trained, ethical, experienced trial lawyer. The whole mandatory
ADR phenomenon appears to be predicated upon the assumed incompe-
tence or venality, or both, of our trial lawyers. This has not been my experi-
ence. Although I have come across incompetent and venal lawyers in my
courtroom, they constitute a small minority. And I personally do not class-
ify them as real trial lawyers. We should thank God for our honorable and
effective trial lawyers, without whose talents the right to a real trial before a
judge or a jury would be meaningless. But I fear that if these mandatory
court-annexed ADR programs take hold, we will have little need for trial
lawyers, or even just plain lawyers. The truth is that if this coercive, pater-
nalistic assault is ultimately defeated, I suspect it will be because of a "few
good lawyers" - the kind that played such an important role in the drafting
of our Constitution.
XI. DIFFERENT JUDGES: DIFFERENT PLEAS TO CONGRESS
Judge Parker sees the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (the Biden bill) as
just "a necessary first step in the right direction," although "it does not go
far enough to achieve true reform of our currently inadequate system of civil
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dispute resolution."' 177 He sees the need for "fundamental change. T178 He
believes that the bar's "vested economic interest in the status quo .. has
effectively silenced the group that should have been the most vocal protector
of the interest of litigants."' 79 He compliments the Congress as being the
leader in making our system "responsive to the needs of the people who use
and support it: the taxpayers."' 80 He lavishes praise on Senator Biden,' 8 '
who:
with single-minded determination, secured passage of this controversial
legislation. Senator Biden, adopting the attitude of Farragut at Mobile
Bay, proceeded full speed ahead in spite of the concern of the judiciary
that the bill potentially encroached upon traditional notions of separa-
tion of powers. The vision afforded by hindsight reveals the wisdom of
Senator Biden's actions.'8 2
Judge Parker wants civil dispute resolution to be even more "court-
driven," than it is today.'8 3 While Judge Parker admires the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990, he states, "it does not go far enough to achieve true
reform."' 8 4 He laments that cases filed subject to CJRA plans "are still
bound by traditional case management techniques and the traditional trial
model."' 8 5 Then he states:
It is highly questionable that merely facilitating deliberate adjudication
of civil cases on the merits in the traditional manner - even with moni-
toring, the limiting of discovery, and improved litigation management
- will actually "ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of civil
disputes," which is the aim of the Act. More is needed.' 8 6
What is this "more" that he seeks? In essence he wants the Congress to
adopt his reformation model and impose it on all of the district courts of this
nation: "We must break the economic stranglehold the traditional model
has on civil litigation and provide an array of court-annexed methods to
resolve civil disputes - an array of public, cost and time effective methods
carrying at least a presumption of finality."' 8 7 Judge Parker believes that
the price our present system extracts from society "compels Congress to at
least reform the civil litigation model."' 188 So we see what Judge Parker
177. Parker, supra note 1, at 1931.
178. Id. at 1930.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. I frankly acknowledge that I, along with most federal judges, opposed the mandatory
micro-management provisions of the original version of the Biden Bill. Assuming Congress
has such authority, it was still bad policy. But I also acknowledge that the revised act has
caused some worthwhile studies of our district courts. I want Congress to realize that each
case is different. Some require a great deal of hands-on management, others do not. Differen-
tial case management requires the exercise of judicial discretion. I ask Congress to trust the
judges to handle each case according to its needs.
182. Parker, supra note 1, at 1930.
183. Id. at 1931.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1931-32 (citation omitted).
187. Id. at 1932-33.
188. Id. at 1933.
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wants of this Congress. What would I ask of Congress?
While I believe that much study and thought must be devoted to the fu-
ture of our federal district courts, still there are certain actions that the Con-
gress could take now to clear the air. It could declare that it is not going to
sanction the annexation of compulsory ADR programs to our federal dis-
trict courts where involuntary participation therein is made a condition pre-
cedent to a party's traditional right to a trial before a judge or a jury. It
could reaffirm its intention to preserve for the inhabitants of this land a
meaningful right to jury trials in civil cases as well as a meaningful right to a
trial before a judge in civil cases where a jury is waived or not required. It
could publicly recognize the importance of the many truth-enhancing rules
and procedures that must be applied and followed in both preparing for and
conducting trials in our federal courts. It could reaffirm its own faith in the
concepts of due process, separation of powers, and equal protection inherent
in our traditional trial system. Dramatically, it could let the sun set on this
plethora of experimentation with mandatory court-annexed ADRs. Viewed
solely by standards of efficiency and costs/benefits, they are not worth the
candle. Viewed from the standpoint of fundamental rights, they are a
disaster.
Recognize this: the rights of parties to civil cases in our federal district
courts are not now the same for citizens in Northern California as they are
for citizens in Eastern Arkansas. And recognize that these mandatory ADR
programs are, in practice, gradually wiping out the right to a trial in civil
cases. When federal district judges try fewer than ten civil cases per year,
that is "tokenism."
XII. DOES THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT PRESERVE THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES?
Now let us narrow the focus to jury trials in civil cases. Some people do
not like jury trials and have been up-front enough to call for the abolition of
the Seventh Amendment.189 I can deal with that debate straightforwardly.
But I am troubled by those who would "finesse" the issue, putting road-
blocks here and burdens there, while still insisting that they have not denied
the right. Congress needs to decide whether, in our American democratic
system, there is value to using juries in civil cases.
Judge Parker acknowledges that the system he suggests "arguably impli-
cates the Seventh Amendment."' 90 This is akin to acknowledging that the
creation of a mandatory, albeit highly evolved, national religion would ar-
guably implicate the First Amendment. The Seventh Amendment to the
United States Constitution says:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United
189. See Kennedy, supra note 140.
190. Parker, supra note 1, at 1921.
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States, than according to the rules of the common law. 19 1
Judge Parker notes that "there were various special, juryless, small claims
tribunals in England and in the American Colonies, territories, and states
before 179 1."192 Looking a bit more closely at the evolution of the jury trial
in this country, we find that even before the enactment of the Bill of Rights,
the authors of our Declaration of Independence specifically mentioned the
loss "in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury" under British rule as one
of the "abuses and usurpations" which made independence necessary. 193
Alexander Hamilton "divided the citizens of his time between those who
thought that jury trial was a 'valuable safeguard to liberty' and those who
thought it was 'the very palladium of free government.' "194 "The founders
of our Nation considered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important
bulwark against tyranny and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left
to the whim of the sovereign, or, it might be added, to that of the
judiciary.';19 5
The importance of the jury as protection against the gradual corrosion or
corruption, or both, of our democracy was underscored by Thomas Jeffer-
son: "[Trial by jury is] the only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which
a government can be held to the principles of its constitution."' 196 In more
modern times, the Supreme Court has noted that:
The right of jury trial in civil cases at common law is a basic and
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurisprudence which is
protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right so fundamental and
sacred to the citizen, whether guaranteed by the Constitution or pro-
vided by statute, should be jealously guarded by the courts. 197
The Court has also explained: "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to jury trial should
be scrutinized with the utmost care." 198
Judge Parker argues that the Seventh Amendment allows for a "balanc-
ing" test of some sort, adjusting for "current demands placed upon vital
societal interests."' 99 In other words, efficiency concerns are seen as suffi-
cient to eviscerate constitutional rights. The few examples that Parker cites
fail to support this proposition. For example, Judge Parker cites Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover2°° for the proposition that modern demands can
191. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
192. Parker, supra note 1, at 1922.
193. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 2, 20 (U.S. 1776).
194. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 397-98 (1943) (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting).
195. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 343 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
196. Mark S. Brodin, Accuracy, Efficiency, and Accountability in the Litigation Process -
The Case for the Fact Verdict, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 15, 16 n.6 (1990) (quoting 3 Writings of
Thomas Jefferson 71 (Washington ed.)).
197. Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942).
198. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (emphasis added).
199. Parker, supra note 1, at 1921.
200. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
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be considered when determining the necessity for a jury trial. 20 1 In fact,
Beacon Theatres explained that, because the right to a jury trial is so impor-
tant, when a court has discretion as to whether a legal or equitable cause
should be tried first, that discretion "must, wherever possible, be exercised to
preserve jury trial."'202 If anything, Beacon Theatres sought to expand the
availability of jury trials. Furthermore, Judge Parker cites a footnote in Ross
v. Bernhard203 for the proposition that courts are allowed to consider "the
practical abilities and limitations of juries" as a relevant factor to the right to
trial by jury.2°4 Leaving aside the fact that this monumental "change" in the
law was addressed in a footnote, and that courts are sharply divided on the
application of this footnote, 20 5 the argument is simply that the complexity of
certain cases renders an adequate remedy at law impossible and thus thrusts
such cases into the equitable arena where there is no Constitutional right to
a jury.
I submit that the Seventh Amendment allows for no such balancing test.
The Supreme Court has flatly rejected "the notion that there is some neces-
sary inconsistency between the desire for speedy justice and the right to jury
trial."' 20 6 The Court has also rejected the argument that delay can override
the Seventh Amendment. 207 To allow the imposition of such a test "would
effectively permit judicial repeal of the Seventh Amendment because nearly
any change in the province of the jury, no matter how drastic the diminution
of its functions, can always be denominated 'procedural reform.' ",208
Judge Parker argues that his system consists of only procedural re-
forms. 20 9 He believes that his system falls within the conditions which "may
be imposed upon the demand of such a [jury] trial, consistently with preserv-
ing the right to it.' '210 He compares his program of ADR tracks, with their
presumptions of finality, to the process of filing a lawsuit, requesting a jury
trial, surviving qualified immunity, and surviving summary judgment.21'
The comparison between Parker's system and the voluntary acts of filing or
requesting a jury trial as equivalent barriers or conditions for a trial needs
201. Parker, supra note 1, at 1923.
202. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510.
203. 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970).
204. Parker, supra note 1, at 1923.
205. See In re United States Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that
there is no complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 478 F. Supp. 889,
935 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (noting that a jury "applying its collective wisdom, judgment and com-
mon sense to the facts of a case (in the light of the proper instructions on the law) is brighter,
more astute, and more perceptive than a single judge, even in a complex or technical case")
vacated, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). But see Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59, 70(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that the "sheer size of the litigation and the complexity of the rela-
tionships among the parties render it as a whole beyond the ability and competence of any jury
to understand and decide with rationality").
206. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 384 (1974).
207. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 64 n.18 (1989).
208. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 332, 346 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
209. Parker, supra note 1, at 1920-21.
210. Id. at 1923 (citing Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 23 (1899)).
211. Id. at 1924.
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little response. Qualified immunity is a defense in certain cases and is almost
always a question of law. If it can be established when viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, then no trial is needed.
The factual disputes would not change the outcome of the case. Summary
judgment is granted only when, the facts being viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of fact, and the
moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.212 In other words,
summary judgment is entered when there is nothing for the jury to do -
there is simply no factual issue necessary to resolve.
Judge Parker also cites Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,213 for the proposi-
tion that procedural innovation can sometimes deny the Seventh Amend-
ment right to a jury trial when such would have been available at common
law.214 Once again, in the case of collateral estoppel, asserted by whomever,
the issues of fact, by hypothesis, have already been decided by a jury or a
judge during a trial. The only question is: who shall be bound thereby? In
every civil case referred for decision to one of Judge Parker's ADR tracks,
there are, again by hypothesis, unresolved material factual issues.
Judge Parker contends that his system involves the same sort of decisions
concerning the "appropriate amount of... judicial resources" warranted by
a case that are typically made by a judge when deciding whether or not to
certify a class or to issue a temporary restraining order (TRO). 215 He fails to
note that neither of those issues implicates the Seventh Amendment. Certifi-
cation of a class does not impede the individual litigant's right to a jury trial,
and TROs are equitable, not legal, in nature, and thus do not require jury
trials.
Judge Parker argues that the right of trial by jury is not infringed by his
proposed system, but that the right "is preserved for and rationally, fairly
distributed to those cases entitled to it."'216 The legitimacy of this argument
is suspect, as one commentator has noted:
To date, the United States Supreme Court has artfully avoided any pro-
nouncement of what substantive jury functions are 'preserved' by the
right to trial by jury in suits at common law ... In general terms, the
Court has spoken grandly of the seventh amendment as a "fundamental
guarantee of the rights and liberties of the people" of which "any seem-
ing curtailment ... should be scrutinized with the utmost care." How-
ever, the Court has yet to define in specific terms which substantive
functions are so inherent to trial by jury, so elementary and necessary,
that the seventh amendment preserves them from judicial or legislative
encroachment. 2 17
Therefore, one cannot predict with comfortable confidence what our
212. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
213. 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1976) (holding that one may assert collateral estoppel to bind
another to the results of some prior litigation, even though the one asserting it was not a party
in that prior litigation).
214. Parker, supra note 1, at 1923-24.
215. Id. at 1924.
216. Id.
217. Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh
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Supreme Court will decide when confronted with the Seventh Amendment
issues raised by these mandatory court-annexed programs. But history,
logic, and precedent give us reason to hope.
Our Constitution states that the right to jury trials in suits at common law
shall be preserved. 218 That is clear enough for me. But even if the Constitu-
tion did not require jury trials in civil cases, good and wise policy would.
What system could be more consonant with our American experience?
When we exclude people from active participation in their justice system,
that system will become elitist and increasingly remote from, and irrelevant
to, the daily lives of the people.
I do not accept my adversaries' efficiency claims, but even if those claims
could be established in dollar terms, that should not be a sufficient reason to
deny civil litigants such a basic right. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted:
The guarantees of the Seventh Amendment will prove burdensome is
some instances; the civil jury surely was a burden to the English gover-
nors who, in its stead, substituted the vice-admiralty court. But, as with
other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the onerous nature of the protec-
tion is no license for contracting the rights secured by the
Amendment. 219
More pointedly, "the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, conve-
nient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will
not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. '220 Do members of Congress
agree or disagree with De Tocqueville's observations:
To look upon the jury as a mere judicial institution, is to confine our
attention to a very narrow view of it; for, however great its influence
may be upon the decisions of the law-courts, that influence is very
subordinate to the powerful effects which it produces on the destinies of
the community at large. The jury is above all a political institution, and
it must be regarded in this light in order to be duly appreciated.... Thejury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit
of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the
habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institu-
tions ..... It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes
them all feel the duties which they are bound to discharge toward soci-
ety; and the part which they take in the government. By obliging men
to turn their attention to which are not exclusively their own, it rubs off
that individual egotism which is the rust of society.
The jury contributes most powerfully to form the judgment, and to
increase the natural intelligence of a people; and this is, in my opinion,
its greatest advantage. It may be regarded as a gratuitous public school
ever open, in which every juror learns to exercise his rights, enters into
daily communication with the most learned.., and becomes practically
acquainted with the laws of his country, which are brought within the
Amendment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 737 (1989) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hodges v.
Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935)).
218. U. S. CONST. amend. VII.
219. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 346 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983).
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reach of his capacity by the efforts of the bar, the advice of the judge,
and even by the passions of the parties. I think that the practical intelli-
gence and political good sense of the Americans are mainly attributable
to the long use which they have made of the jury in civil causes.221
It is true the British have about done away with the jury trial in civil
cases. Lord Donaldson of Lymington addressing a Conference on Litigation
at the Great Hall at Lincoln's Inn observed:
You are apparently concerned at the enthusiasm of juries for award-
ing punitive damages and at the amount of those damages. In this
country we have virtually abolished juries in civil cases with two excep-
tions. These are, first, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment
and, second, defamation. The police are usually defendants in the for-
mer type of action and the Press in the latter. Curiously enough, there
are few problems in actions against the police, the jury usually reaching
a correct conclusion on liability and being reasonable in their awards of
damages. It is quite otherwise in relation to the Press. Here juries take
the defendants to the cleaners and do so under the guise of awarding
compensatory and not punitive damages.
There is no doubt that the average citizen holds the Press in con-
tempt. There is also little doubt that, despite all advice from the judges,
they approach the matter from the point of view of what they think that
the Press can afford. As various popular tabloids run competitions with
enormous prizes designed to boost circulation, awards by juries bear
some resemblance to intercontinental telephone numbers. Until re-
cently the Court of Appeal could only order a retrial, which merely
risked arriving at another perverse decision. Now the law has been
changed to allow the Court of Appeal to substitute its own award. That
there have been few appeals stems largely from the fact that plaintiffs
settle for part of the sum awarded. However, I have little doubt that
sooner or later defamation cases will join other civil claims in being
tried by a judge alone or possibly by a judge sitting with two lay
assessors.
222
So marvelously British! And so revealing as to the chasm in legal thinking
that still separates us from our British cousins. Although we have much in
common, there are fundamental differences in our systems. Most British
institutions are elitist rather than egalitarian, and the British do not have the
benefit of a judiciary independent of the Legislative Branch of their govern-
ment. Nor do they have anything equivalent to the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution. Frankly, in my opinion, our judicial system is far superior
to theirs in its ability to fairly deal with a heterogenous, complex, democratic
society. And, it is my further opinion that their system will move toward
ours - and not vice versa - as their society becomes less homogenous and
the "outs" insist on getting into the club. The British and the Canadians are
221. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 308-12 (Henry Reeve trans.,
4th ed. 1845).
222. Theodore R. Tetzlaff, Opening Statement: The English Rule from the English Perspec-
tive, LITIG., Summer 1992, at 1-2.
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now trying to retrieve lost rights.223
The right to serve on juries is a precious one that we judges should en-
courage. By our jury plans we have been expanding the opportunity for
more of our citizens to serve by decreasing the length, and thus the burden,
of that service. The use of mandatory court-annexed ADRs on the other
hand will inevitably reduce the opportunity for such service, thus making
our judicial system increasingly remote from the people. What we need
from our Representatives and Senators in the Congress is a ringing declara-
tion that our traditional trial system is of great value and will be preserved
and protectedl
XIII. TRIALS IN "TRADITIONAL" COURTS VS. TRIALS IN
"ADR" COURTS
One of the more interesting statistical figures is the one that shows the
number of trials per judgeship.224 The figure stayed in the high forties dur-
ing most of the 1970s, then fell to around forty until the mid 1980s. From
1985-1989 the average each year was thirty-five trials per judgeship; in 1990
it went to thirty-six; in 1991 and in 1992 the figure fell to thirty-one. In the
Eastern District of Arkansas we averaged forty-three trials per judgeship in
1992, far below the average of the twenty year period between 1970 and
1990, when we tried more than sixty cases per year per judgeship.
By contrast, examine the figures for the districts most noted for their ex-
perimentation with court-annexed ADRs: the Northern District of Califor-
nia, the Western District of Michigan, the Northern District of Ohio and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Here are the figures for total trials per
judgeship in 1992: the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, twenty-seven trials
per judgeship; the Northern District of Ohio, fifteen; the Northern District
of California, fourteen; and the Western District of Michigan, fifteen.225 So
three of the four districts had less than half the national average of thirty-
one trials per judgeship. Since most of these districts are terminating their
cases at around the national average, while trying less than half the national
average, we can surmise that these coercive ADR programs are doing their
job by forcing settlements, thus preventing trials. The message is: civil cases
in our United States District Courts can be disposed of in the traditional
manner or by mandatory ADRs. But the overall performance of the
mandatory ADR districts is no better than that of districts which do not use
such programs, and, by some measurements, not as good. The other, re-
lated, inference is that the judges in the traditionalist courts are spending
their work-time quite differently from the judges utilizing mandatory ADRs.
Let us carry this inquiry farther: what proportion of the trials per judge-
ship are criminal and what proportion civil? At my request the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts sent to me the figures for the total
223. See Bert Raphael, A Call for More Civil Jury Trials, ADVOCS. Soc'y J., Aug. 1988, at
27.




number of civil and criminal trials in each district in the United States.226 In
Eastern Arkansas, which has 5 judgeships, we had 163 civil trials and 60
criminal trials; Northern California, with 14 judgeships, had 133 civil and
108 criminal; Western Michigan, with 5 judgeships, had 33 civil and 44
criminal; Northern Ohio, with 12 judgeships, had 141 civil and 62 criminal;
and Eastern Pennsylvania, with 23 judgeships, had 555 civil and 138
criminal.227
What was the total number of civil trials per judgeship in those districts?
Eastern Arkansas 32.6; Northern California 9.5; Western Michigan 6.6;
Northern Ohio 11.7; and Eastern Pennsylvania 24.1. These figures are cal-
culated on the basis of judgeships, not judges, and they do not account for
the number of civil cases that are tried by Magistrate-Judges with the con-
sent of the parties. So to find out how many civil trials are completed per
judge we would need to know how many Senior Judges the district has and
what load share they carry. For instance, the Northern District of Califor-
nia has fourteen judgeships which are filled by "active" judges. It appears
that several of these judgeships were unfilled in 1991-1992. In 1992 it had
nine Senior Judges. If the senior judges averaged a workload of one-third of
that for active judges this would mean Northern California had the
equivalent of three additional active judges which would bring their total
active workforce from fourteen (when all active positions are filled) to seven-
teen, and the number of civil trials to slightly less than eight per judge.
Northern California has seven full-time Magistrate Judges who can try any
civil case with the consent of the parties. If they tried four civil cases per
year each that would reduce the civil cases to be tried by U.S. District
Judges from 133 to 105 and the number of civil trials per district judge to
just over six. There were 431 civil cases filed per judgeship, so, on this analy-
sis, it would appear that the district judges are trying, jury and non-jury, less
than 2% of their civil cases!228
So is it not fair to observe that these mandatory ADR districts are slowly
but surely doing away with the meaningful right to a trial in civil cases? I
have not yet been able to get the figures which would show how many of the
civil trials were jury and how many non-jury. But even if they were all jury
trials, one could also say that the Seventh Amendment, as a practical reality,
is fading away in Northern California.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. Another set of figures interests me. For Northern California the period from
filing to disposition of civil cases is eight months, which, like Eastern Arkansas, is one month
better than the national average. The period from issue to trial, however, is twenty-one
months in Northern California, whereas the national average is fourteen months and for East-
ern Arkansas eleven months. Id. Does that not suggest that those parties forced into North-
ern California's various ADR programs, who accept the ADR result, get in and out of the
court about as fast as the national average, whereas those that insist on a trial "de novo" have
a long, long wait?
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XIV. WORKLOAD RELIEF: MORE JUDGES OR LESS
JURISDICTION
The December-January 1993 issue of Judicature contains a debate which
relates directly to the mandatory ADR issue. That debate is: Should the
Congress meet the problem created by increased workloads by simply con-
tinuing the past practice of increasing the number of judgeships and support-
ing personnel; or should it establish a limit on the number of federal
judgeships and deal with the workload problem through other means? Pro-
fessor Victor Williams of the John Jay College of Criminal Justice takes the
position that the increased work load should simply be handled by increas-
ing the number of judges.229
Judge Jon 0. Newman takes the contrary position. 230 He believes that a
policy should be established limiting the number of federal judgeships to
1,000.231 By way of explanation, he states:
Today, most observers regard the overall quality of the federal judiciary
as higher than that of the average state judiciary. At a size of 3,000 to
4,000, its quality would be indistinguishable from the most pedestrian
of state judiciaries.
A federal judiciary rising above 1,000 and heading for 3,000
judges will be of lesser quality and dominated by a burgeoning bureau-
cracy of law clerks, staff counsel, magistrate judges, and other ancillary
personnel.
In this decade, we will decide whether in the next century the federal
judicial system will remain at a size that enables it to be true to the
purpose, or become a vast faceless bureaucracy that will undermine the
very need to have a federal judiciary. Few choices to be made in our
lifetimes will have such effect on such a vital institution of our national
life. 2 32
Judge Parker appears to agree with Judge Newman when he states:
There might appear to be a ready solution to problems associated
with modern litigation - one that does not require significant reforma-
tion measures. There is an obvious temptation to simply call for an
increase in the number of judges and other court personnel in order to
supply the rising demand for civil dispute resolution. Indeed, in an ef-
fort to cope with the ever-expanding universe of civil case filings, Con-
gress has significantly expanded the number of federal district court and
appellate judgeships. But the universe of judicial resources is incapable
of the sort of practically infinite expansion needed to keep pace with
unchecked, lawyer-driven, civil case demands. Moreover, expanding
the federal judiciary beyond a certain point - which point appears to
229. Victor Williams, Solutions to Federal Judicial Gridlock, 76 JUDICATURE 185 (1992-
93).
230. Jon 0. Newman, 1,000 Judges - The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76
JUDICATURE 187 (1992-93).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 188, 194.
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be very near, if it has not already been reached - causes at least as
many problems as it solves.233
Yes, the federal courts should be special; they should not be converted into
"a faceless, bureaucracy."
If Judge Parker gets his way, however, the "bureaucracy" argument and
the "quality" argument will gain new significance. Why? Because then we
will indeed have a federal judicial bureaucracy of immense size. His federal
dispute resolution centers will employ or subcontract with thousands of ad-
ditional personnel. For instance, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has
appointed 1,200 attorneys to act as arbitrators. 234 If every court had such a
program one would expect over 30,000 lawyers to be involved nationally in
that one mandatory ADR program. What about the mediators and the early
neutral evaluators, etc., etc.? And, of course, when a court installs such a
program someone must oversee it and handle the paper work. I am not
aware of any careful study of the actual additional costs that result from the
annexation of such programs to our district courts, but I suspect that they
are not inconsequential. Additionally, there is no reason why a district court
should limit itself to only one such ADR program. The Northern District of
California has several, as do a few other districts. If Judge Parker's proposal
is accepted, the number of additional buildings and personnel required to
staff the "array" of, or "battery" of, his new track programs boggle the
mind! It is respectfully suggested that the Congress would want to make a
careful study of the long range funding requirements before nationalizing the
233. Parker, supra note 1, at 1926 (citation omitted). I am continuously amazed to see
Judge Parker, throughout his article, cite authority which so aptly undermines his main thesis.
For example, Judge Parker cites Mr. Theodore Tetzlaff's statement of critical questions includ-
ing the question: "[How to preserve and improve the jury trial system so that it can continue
to discharge its responsibilities under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments .... Id. at 1906
(quoting Theodore R. Tetzlaff, Opening Statement: Four Urgent Questions, 18 LITIGATION 1,
2 (1991)). He also quotes the Administrative Office report of January 1991, which stated that
"[uinless actions are taken ... [t]he circumstances will lead judges to have less of a sense of
personal responsibility and accountability for the work they produce." Id. at 1908 n.9 (altera-
tion in original) (quoting William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judici-
ary, THE THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1992, at 2). Additionally, Judge Parker quotes Carolyn
Dineen King, who said: "In my view, no judge would specifically condone a two track justice
system .. " Id. (quoting Carolyn D. King, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REV. 955,
963 (1991)). Then he quotes Senator Moynihan's statement:
[O]urs is the only civilization in the world where there is something conspicuous
and central to our urban arrangements called a courthouse. Think about it.
When you wander across Europe looking at cathedrals, do you ever see a court-
house? No....
It speaks well of us. It speaks to the world about how things can be different. It
reminds us how very, very fragile any society is, and how strong the courts have
to be to ensure its continued strength.
Id. at 1912 (quoting Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Speech at White Plains, New York (Dec.
4, 1992) (transcript available from SMU Law Review)). Finally, he quotes Professor Judith
Resnik, who stated: "Proponents of management may be forgetting the quintessential judicial
obligations of conducting a reasoned inquiry, articulating the reasons for decision, and subject-
ing those reasons to appellate review - characteristics that have long defined judging and
distinguished it from other tasks." Id. at 1919-20 (quoting Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 445 (1982)).
234. I believe these attorneys are classified as "independent contractors."
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dispute resolution system of this nation and before permitting federal district
courts to devise and install as many different ADRs as they might want.
How about the "quality" argument? Judge Newman believes that federal
district courts should be special places with judges of "uniformly high qual-
ity."' 235 Judge Parker seems to agree, and I certainly agree. But if Judge
Parker and the other mandatory court-annexed ADR advocates have their
way, is it not fair to ask: Why do we need such quality? When judges do not
judge, where is the need for judicial quality? Under Judge Parker's civil
justice system the principal function of district judges would be to make
"track" assignments and "exemption" decisions, conduct conferences, and
manage a faceless bureaucracy. Who needs a judge, much less a judge of
"high quality?"
For over 200 years our federal district courts have indeed been special
places. I want them to retain that distinct status which is so essential to
their effectiveness. I do not want that image blurred by the annexation of
these alien ADR programs. As I have said before, I view the Article III
federal district court as something very special - the place where real trials
are conducted, the truth determined, rights vindicated, and justice obtained.
Justice - not compromise, not efficiency, not cost effectiveness, but justice.
There ought to be a place where justice, and justice alone, controls and de-
fines the parameters of permissible procedures - where one is not forced to
submit to something less than due process, even temporarily. I urge reten-
tion of a stand-alone Article III federal trial court where the people of this
nation may truly have, and know they may have, their day in court unen-
cumbered by costly non-judicial diversions to which they have not con-
sented. I do not have an answer to the "numbers" question, but I do know
what an Article III trial court should be.
XV. CONCLUSION: WHO WILL BE THE JUDGE
My opponents who are giving up on our traditional civil trial system and
who want to substitute one or more of these mandatory court-annexed pro-
grams for it, are all good, conscientious, intelligent, distinguished judges.
They firmly believe that their proposals are in the best interest of our nation.
But what can I say? When you are wrong, you are wrong! And, in my
opinion, they are wrong on this issue. On the other hand, I am sure they
view my effort as the last gasp of an old judge fighting the inevitability of
change. Wrong!
I accept that change is not only inevitable; it is an imperative. I embrace
it,236 for I truly believe that every generation has the duty to turn over to the
next a better America. The test, however, is not just a different America, but
a better America, one that is always moving closer to, not away from, those
235. Newman, supra note 229, at 194.
236. There are many ways in which our trial system can be improved. I am laboring in
that field, and I invite my opponents in this debate to use their considerable talents to that
same end.
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great goals and values set forth in our Declaration of Independence and our
Constitution.
In the end it really makes little difference what I think or what they think.
The outcome will be determined by those law professionals and lay people,
especially those Senators and Representatives in our Congress, who become
interested in this issue, study it, make their own judgments, and then express
them loud and clear. They will be the "judges" whose decisions really
count.

